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Abstract 
 Contagion events have occurred throughout history leaving death and destruction 
in their wake. Often sensationalized in movies and shows such as Contagion and The 
Walking Dead, contagion events are life-altering events filled with gory symptoms and 
elevated mortality rates. The dangers of contagion events prompted governments to 
develop agencies with the purpose of preventing and mitigating the risks contagions pose. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other agencies across the 
globe pour millions of dollars each year into eliminating the risk of contagions and 
making the world a safer place. However, while more resources are dedicated to fighting 
contagion events than ever before, risk remains and new areas of tension are borne out of 
disease management. 
 The Politics of Contagion explores three recent contagion events and unpacks the 
consequences of each event. The Anthrax contagion of 2001, Ebola of 2014, and the 
current Zika outbreak are examined as well as the role of the CDC. The Politics of 
Contagion analyzes the role of policy via the CDC in contagion events and explores its 
effects or moments of tension. Moments of tension during contagion events can include 
the creation of risk groups, racism, and economic damages. While we have come a long 
way from the days of the Black Plague, this analysis highlights the areas where 
improvement is needed. From the media panic and hostility toward CDC-Ebola policies 
in 2014 to the current decline in tourism to Zika hotbeds, this text highlights the role 
policy plays in the creation of these moments of tension.  
 At the center of this thesis is Foucault’s argument that power resides in every area 
of life. If power indeed exists everywhere, then power must also lie in the CDC and its 
policies concerning contagion events. The power is exercised via CDC policies and 
recommendations and ultimately aids in the birthing of many moments of tension. These 
moments of tension echo beyond the borders of the United States, and flow throughout 
the global community. Through analyzing the CDC’s handling of the case studies 
included in this thesis, I unpack the moments of tension and argue the role of power in 
the policies, which have the unintended effect of aiding in the creation of moments of 
tension for both United States citizens and individuals beyond U.S. borders. 
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The Politics of Contagion & Power in the Subtle 
 In the past century, the rise of the nation-state and increasing modes of 
globalization radically changed the world. From increased global technological 
connections to the birth of new economic superpowers, scholars have explored many of 
these changes and advancements. One major change in the past century, which is often 
overlooked by scholars, is the ways in which we manage and create policies concerning 
contagion events. At the conclusion of the Second World War, two major health 
organizations were created with health related purposed including the management and 
control of contagion events. One of these health governance agencies, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, is the focal point of this thesis and research on the 
politics of contagion.  
 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or CDC, formed in 1946 in 
Atlanta, Georgia. The intention of the CDC is to manage disease from an United States-
American perspective. In its mission statement, the CDC states to work “24/7 to protect 
America from health, safety, and security threats, both foreign and in the U.S.” and to 
“increase the health security” of America (CDC.gov: 2014). The CDC clearly established 
a link between health and security, which allows the organization to create policies 
designed to protect U.S. citizens from health-security risks. In the new millennium, a few 
large-scale contagion events erupted including Avian Bird Flu pandemic of 2009 and the 
Ebola epidemic of 2014. All recent contagion events had a strong CDC presence with the 
purpose of controlling the outbreaks to protect U.S.-American lives. The involvement of 
the CDC and its policies inspired the mission of this thesis, which explores the politics of 
contagion and epidemic events via the policies of the CDC. As this thesis explores the 
Young 7 
 
politics of contagion, it unpacks the moments of tension that occur when disease and 
policies meet. Additionally, it highlights the power of the subtle that lives in the CDC 
policies, which can be an influencing factor in the creation of moments of tension. 
 Now, before we delve deeply into the research, it is important to define a few key 
terms that come up frequently in this paper. When I speak of contagion, I am referring to 
a transmission of a disease with life-threatening potential and how the disease is 
contained and controlled. By epidemic, I am referring to an upgraded level of contagion 
where the disease has now affected mass amounts of a civilian population and has 
crossed national borders where it is infecting new hosts (Young 2016: 2). The phrase 
“moment of tension” refers to an unpleasant situation that forms out of a number of 
factors including CDC policy. Examples of moments of tension can include but are not 
limited to instances of bias, fear-based behavior, and economic damages. Finally, the 
phrase, “power in the subtle,” refers to the impact seemingly insignificant or overlooked 
areas of life have in affecting groups of individuals or regions. Examples of subtle 
powers can include the language we use, our gaze, the things we omit, and countless 
others.   
 In highlighting the power of the subtle in the CDC policies, we can understand 
how moments of tension are birthed. We can also prepare more thoroughly for future 
contagion events and, hopefully, avoid creating the same moment of tension. It is my 
intent to show my reader the shades of gray that concern health policy and power. It is 
paramount that we understand how power can exist in any facet of life and how even the 
most well-intended policies can influence unpleasant events. It is equally important to 
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recognize the global power of the CDC and its policies whose consequences can cross 
borders and ripple across the globe. I hope my reader will take away from this text the 
importance of health agencies such as the CDC, and understand the areas where 
improvement can be made. We must manage the risk of contagion, but at the same time 
create policies that do not harm certain individuals who are sometimes caught in the 
tension where policy and health-security meet. Before we delve into the research, let us 
explore the scholarly discourse on the subject.  
Literature Review 
Scholars have crafted a diverse and in-depth body of literature that explores the 
complexities of the politics of contagion. From the management of major contagion 
events such as the Ebola epidemic of 2014 and the SARS crisis of 2003 to the historical 
realities of the phenomena of contagion including the history of the term contagion itself, 
there is an abundance of scholarly material that illustrates key elements of the politics of 
contagion. In my analysis of the body of literature encompassing the politics of 
contagion, I noticed a trend of discourse that, for the purposes of the literature review; I 
broke down into three categories. The themes of risk, fear, and sovereignty are the 
dominant players in the scholarly discourse of the politics of contagion. These three 
themes frequently interlock and give great insight into the complications and effects that 
are birthed from contagion situations. In these next few pages, I will unearth each theme 
and unpack many scholarly works that reside in each theme. Let us now explore the first 
and, perhaps, the dominant theme of risk and its relation to the politics of contagion. 
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 Risk encompasses countless areas of life including natural disaster, warfare, and 
death. Of course, risk is also deeply intertwined with healthcare and the language of risk 
is used to highlight countless negative health effects. For instance, the number of 
cigarettes and the years an individual has smoked increases the risk of an individual 
contracting lung cancer (Mayo Clinic: 2015). Also, people who live in sunny climates or 
have had serious sunburns as a child are at a higher risk of developing skin cancer (Mayo 
Clinic: 2015). Whether it concerns health, disaster, or death it is clear that risk is usually 
used to describe a negative facet of life, and risk concerning the politics of contagion is 
no different. In fact, as we will soon see, based on the wide body of literature in this 
branch of the politics of contagion, scholars demonstrate that risk via contagion is quite 
broad with risk covering infection, death, and entire groups of human beings.  
 The creation of risk groups both within and outside the boundaries of a given 
nation-state increases during times of a contagion according to many scholars. Sargent 
and Larchanché explore the phenomena of the creation of risk groups based on health 
concerns in their text Disease, Risk, And Contagion: French Colonial And Postcolonial 
Constructions Of “African” Bodies. In their research, Sargent and Larchanché explore 
the lives of Sub-Saharan immigrants that relocated to France and the ultimate “public 
expressions of threats to national identity, stereotyping, and discrimination” that ensued 
(Sargent 2014: 458).  
 The authors researched both the colonial beliefs of an “infectious and contagious” 
African body and current media and scholarly articles that discuss a prevalence of 
“infectious diseases among the French immigrant population”, which in turn created a 
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risk group within French society (Sargent 2014: 462). The authors cite Tuberculosis as an 
example of how the Sub-Saharan immigrants became a risk group. In their research, the 
authors found a common belief that TB is a “disease of transplantation” and an “imported 
pathology,” which fed into the National Front Party’s anti-immigrant message of TB as 
an “imminent threat” to French society and presenting the Sub-Saharan African 
immigrants as a risk group of contamination (Sargent 2014: 462). Thus, the authors 
present a clear view of contagion situations and how groups can be targeted or deemed a 
risk to society based on health reasons.  
 Many other scholars explore the creation of risk groups because of contagion 
events including Polly Price. In her text, Infecting The Body Politic, Price explores the 
2014 Ebola crisis and the history of barring immigrants with mental health issues to 
establish the existence of a risk group of the “undesirable immigrant” that is created on 
the basis of health (Price 2015: 919). Price illuminates a lack of legal framework to 
protect the risk group of the immigrant including the absence of a “right to travel” thus 
establishing that “no state or international organization must ensure that an unhealthy 
migrant can move from place to place” (Price 2015: 923). Essentially, Price highlights a 
series of gaps in international law that allow immigrants to be placed in a category of risk 
on the basis of health and to, ultimately, be treated differently from other groups in 
society. 
 When discussing the role of risk in the politics of contagion, it is paramount to 
bring up Nikolas Rose and his piece The Politics of Life Itself. Rose believes biopolitics is 
“bound up with the rise of the life sciences, human sciences, and clinical medicine” and 
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that “contemporary biopolitics is risk politics” (Rose 2007: 1). Rose shows how risk is 
deeply tied into health by illuminating risk profiling of individuals by the insurance 
industry. Rose shows how individuals are placed into risk groups based on genealogy, 
family history of illness, or behaviors such as smoking (Rose 2007: 8). From the current 
profiling of pregnant women at deemed at risk of a miscarriage to the sterilization of the 
“feeble minded” deemed a risk to the overall health of the population, Rose shows how 
risk based on health has been and is still used to treat certain groups differently than 
others (Rose 2007: 8).  
 Another scholar examines the role of risk group formation via contagion in a 
specific case study concerning an Ebola scare in Canada in 2001. Adeyanju, in his text 
Not In Canada, analyzes the case of a Congolese visitor in Ontario who was hospitalized 
in 2001 with suspected Ebola virus symptoms. In his research, Adeyanju explores the 
media reaction to the hospitalization and the ultimate tension that spread throughout the 
community. Adeyanju’s data yielded a high frequency of charged terminology including 
“Ebola” and “deadly” (Adeyanju 2010: 38). Furthermore, Adeyanju identified evidence 
of the creation of a risk group by “otherizing” the patient through “embedding the 
nationality of the patient in the headlines with the word Ebola” (Adeyanju 2010: 40). 
Thus, Adeyanju establishes the formation of a risk group based on contagion fears and 
shows how a racial element can become involved in oppressing the risk group; so much 
so that ultimately a white supremacist group protested outside the hospital of the patient 
(Adeyanju 2010: 34). 
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 Finally, when examining risk group creation via contagion, it is necessary to 
explore the psychology of a population during a contagion event. Robin Goodwin 
explores this branch of psychology in the text Initial Psychological Responses Influenza 
A, H1N1 and questioned populations in Malaysia and Europe to find out the populations 
perceptions of a few traditional risk groups during times of contagion. The data yielded 
results of a majority of the Malaysian sample group believing that the homeless and 
prostitutes carried a higher risk of contracting H1NI than other groups (Goodwin: 2009). 
Furthermore, the study highlighted that 71 percent of the Malaysian sample group was at 
least “somewhat concerned” about contracting the virus (Goodwin: 2009). Thus, the 
study illustrated that judgment on particular “out groups” during times of pandemic could 
have “implications for the equitable treatment” of the above groups (Goodwin: 2009). 
 In the discourse surrounding the politics of contagion, risk groups are a main 
feature and the notion of risk group creation is deeply connected with the second branch 
of fear. Much of the discourse on the politics of contagion identifies the usage of 
contagion events as a tactic for fear. The fear that erupts in contagion events can 
ultimately link with the branch of risk group creation because fear can create a hysteria 
that can cause bias against groups that are perceived to be a health threat to the general 
population. Many scholars have analyzed the role of fear in contagion situations and 
solely focus on the element of fear and not the birth of risk groups. One such author is 
Martin Pernick, who explores the historical realities of the term contagion and the fear 
factor that surrounds the term.  
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 In his text, Contagion And Culture, Pernick shows how deeply rooted negativity 
is in the term contagion by illuminating its history, which includes a connotation with 
“sin and grief” (Pernick 2002:860). Pernick also explores the role of fear in relation to 
“epidemics and panic” including a direct linkage with disease (Pernick; 2002:861). 
According to Pernick, it was not uncommon to see “died of fright” on death certificates 
as recently as the 19th century (Pernick 2002:861). Also, Pernick illustrates how fear and 
“mass hysteria” almost always accompany epidemics including the Black Death and 
particularly deadly cholera years (Pernick 2002:861). Pernick argues that “other people” 
perceived as the source of contagions such as outsiders, immigrants, and minorities can 
be targeted during an outbreak event (Pernick 2002: 862). Thus, Pernick is able to 
identify the bond of fear and contagions and link it to the first branch of the creation of 
risk groups via contagion.  
 Magnusson and Zalloua also discuss the relation of fear and contagion in their 
text Contagion: Health, Fear & Sovereignty. Magnusson and Zalloua highlight that 
contagion is frequently used as the “metaphor of choice” for a series of non-health related 
events including global financial crises, immigration, obesity, divorce, fast food, and 
radical Islam (Magnusson & Zalloua 2012: 4). The authors seek to understand what 
happens when the term contagion evolves beyond its original meaning and begin to 
“contaminate other discourses in the social and humanities” (Magnusson & Zalloua 
2012:4). The text features a chapter written by Pricilla Wald, who is also able to link the 
fear factor surrounding contagion with the formation of risk groups. Wald explores a 
mythical and awe-inspiring quality that initially surpasses the fear factor around viruses 
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and cites the example of a researcher describing Ebola under a microscope as “a 
gorgeously wrought ice castle” that was “totally pure” (Magnusson Zalloua & Ward 
2012:102-103). However, this mythical quality bestowed on contagions also enhances 
their demonic nature, which is often associated with perceived carriers in addition to the 
virus itself (Magnusson Zalloua & Ward 2012:103). Thus, Ward shows how contagion as 
a tactic for fear is able to create risk groups including her examples of “gay men and 
Haitians during the early years of HIV, Asians during the SARS outbreak of 2003, and 
Mexicans and U.S. Americans during the H1N1 outbreak of 2009” (Magnusson Zalloua 
& Ward 2012:103). 
 While many scholars studied the spread of fear from a contagion event, Sherry 
Towers analyzed the role of the media in the spread of fear during a contagion event. In 
her text, Mass Media and the Contagion of Fear: The Case of Ebola in America, Towers 
researched Twitter data and contagion related Internet search during the initial weeks of 
the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Tower’s data yielded a spike in contagion fear during the Ebola 
outbreak and that a single news segment on Ebola yielded “tens of thousands of Internet 
searches in the American population” (Towers 2015:10). Thus, Towers research 
highlights the spike of an atmosphere of fear during a contagion event. 
 The element of fear in a contagion situation was also explore by Li Ping Wong 
and I-Ching Sam in their text Behavioral responses to the influenza A(H1N1) outbreak in 
Malaysia. Wong and Sam conducted telephone interviews of residents in various 
provinces in Malaysia during the summer of 2009 to explore the participants 
understanding of the H1N1 virus and their level of fear towards the virus. The data 
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yielded 41.1 percent of respondents were “slightly fearful” of the virus, and 32.1 percent 
of respondents were “fearful” of the virus (Wong & Sam 2011:25). Furthermore, the 
study found a “significant positive correlation between the level of fear with the number 
of health-protective behaviors and impacts” taken by participants (Wong & Sam 
2011:28). Thus, the authors demonstrate that the existence of fear surrounding a 
contagion event and how the higher the fear factor becomes, the more it will have 
behavioral effects including avoiding public places and avoiding consuming certain foods 
(Wong & Sam 2011:28). 
 Fear and risk group creation are key staples in the discourse on the politics of 
contagion, and both have a strong relation to the third branch concerning sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is a dominant branch in the discourse on the politics of contagion because 
contagion events can be seen as a threat to the sovereignty of a given nation-state. Many 
scholars focus on sovereignty, in particular, because within much of the rhetoric during 
contagion events is a call for strengthened national security to protect citizens from the 
health security threat of a given disease. While some scholars focus on some of the 
outcomes of the politics of contagion including the bias that comes from the creation of 
risk groups, Andrew Price-Smith solely focuses on the merger between national security 
and contagion in his text Contagion and Chaos: Disease, Ecology, and National Security 
in the Era of Globalization. 
 Price-Smith explores a series of case studies including the Spanish influenza 
pandemic of 1918-19, the HIV crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the SARS outbreak of 
2003. Price-Smith argues, “the health of the body politic contributes directly to the 
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functionality of the apparatus of governance” and “epidemics present a direct threat to the 
power of the state” (Price-Smith 2009:1-2). For instance, Price-Smith shows how the 
governance of Canada was affected by the SARS contagion of 2002-03 through budget 
cuts to the public health sector that led to a cut in staff (Price-Smith 2009:147). With 
fewer scientists investigating regional disease, Canada faced less staffing at hospitals, 
numerous quarantine violations, and ultimately a failure to keep the contagion from 
spreading (Price-Smith 2009:147). Thus, Price-Smith illuminates the stress contagion 
events pose to the power of a nation-state in that contagions have the power to erode 
confidence in the power of a given nation state to handle a crisis effectively.  
 Another author uses the 2014 Ebola epidemic to illustrate the linkage between the 
politics of contagion and sovereignty. In Epidemics, national security, and US 
immigration policy, Robbie Totten explores the United States classification of Ebola as 
“a national security priority” as opposed to a humanitarian concern and its implications 
(Totten 2015:199). Totten discusses the three pillars of contagion policy designed to 
protect the sovereignty and security of the US, which include policies that restrict 
entrance to foreigners suspected of carrying a dangerous disease, quarantines of 
immigrants thought to carry a dangerous disease, and the authority of the President to halt 
all immigration during a contagion event overseas (Totten 2015:203). Thus, Totten shows 
the how the nation-state views contagion as a concern to sovereignty and security, and 
ultimately, how immigrant risk groups can be created out of necessity to preserve 
sovereignty.  
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 One more scholar that highlights contagions relation to security and sovereignty is 
Samuel Cohn. In his text, Plague and prejudice, Cohn illustrates the elements of threat to 
the sovereignty of a nation-state that are birthed in contagion events. Cohn explores the 
violence and unrest that erupted in countless historical examples of contagion and 
discusses the switch that occurred in the 19th century from the “other” being on the 
receiving end of violence to the dominant classes becoming the new target (Cohn 
2016:34). During the cholera outbreak of the 19th century, “cholera riots” broke out with 
masses of civilians who were “driven to madness over the reported cruelties to cholera 
patients”, invaded a quarter of the city and plundered shops, stoned citizens, and beat the 
deputy governor to death (Cohn 2016:34). Thus, Cohn shows how contagion events can 
trigger elements of unrest that have the capability to disrupt the security and sovereignty 
of a nation-state. Furthermore, his discusses of targeted risk groups illustrate how 
targeted groups during contagion situations have the power to strike back, which can 
harm the security of the nation-state. 
 While the above scholars provided an excellent overview of the politics of 
contagion, I am interested in exploring specific health management agencies and their 
handling of contagion events. All of the above authors highlight the tensions and 
undesirable aftermaths that arise from contagion situations, but not enough is said about 
the management and policy aspect of contagion control. In fact, much of the discourse on 
the politics of contagion completely ignores the role of disease management agencies in 
contagion events and only focuses on the undesirable aftermaths including the branch of 
fear and the branch of risk group creation, which is a major gap in the literature that I will 
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address. As many scholars demonstrated, contagion has had a negative connotation for 
centuries and many early examples such as the Black Plague and the cholera outbreak of 
the 19th century created what scholars would describe as chaos and bias. However, in 
recent years major health organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention have stepped in with the purpose of improving global health and mitigating 
contagion risk. Yet, even with these organizations, tensions continue to emerge, which 
begs the question; are the policies and the handling of contagion events by the CDC 
sufficient in combating the moments of tension that occur in contagion events? 
 One scholar who is deeply intertwined in the purpose of my research is Michael 
Foucault. In his text, The History of Sexuality, Foucault explicitly states, “Power is 
everywhere” (Foucault 1978: 93). For Foucault, power is not “acquired, seized, or shared, 
something that one holds onto or allows to slip away; power is exercised from 
innumerable points (Foucault 1978: 94). Thus, power flows our world like a river, 
touching and transferring its presence to everything it encounters. If according to 
Foucault, power is everywhere, then power must also exist in the subtle moments. The 
subtle can be the unintended consequences of seemingly innocent choices or the language 
we use that can be unknowingly charged. It is this subtle power, which I believe resides 
in the policies of the CDC and the ways in which the organization handles contagion 
events. The subtle power of the CDC’s policies can influence groups of people, the 
media, and many other facets of life.   
 Certain scholars, such as James Hodge, would discredit the importance of the 
above health organization for reasons including the lack of power that the CDC has to 
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enforce its recommendations during emergencies (Hodge 2015:356). But, there is a 
broader power that health agencies hold and it deserves exploration. The language these 
organizations use during contagion briefings, the policy measures they recommend 
during outbreaks, and the ways in which they address the moments of tension that arise 
during epidemics have the power to cross borders and impact the lives of citizens across 
the globe. The literature available provides an abundance of knowledge on the politics of 
contagion, but many key questions remain. How exactly does the power in the subtle of 
CDC policies effect different arenas of life Does the CDC do enough to combat the 
undesirable elements that arise in contagion events? And finally, is the current ratio of 
individuals caught in the tensions of the politics of contagion worth the cost of 
eliminating a contagion? I hope that my data and case studies will provide answers to 
these questions and fill the gaps in the discourse on contagion management.  
Methodology & Research Design 
 As mentioned in the literature review, this thesis takes a broader view of the 
politics of contagion. While other scholars merely explored the aftermath of contagion 
events, I explored the policies of the CDC, which I believe assist in the birthing of these 
moments of tension. To fully appreciate the bigger picture of the politics of contagion, 
this thesis takes a qualitative framework to highlight the politics of contagion and the 
power in the subtle. The research includes an analysis of three unique case studies of 
which the CDC was deeply involved. Because the politics of contagion is something that 
cannot be entirely explored in a quantitative framework, ample examples of scholarly 
discourse are planted throughout the case studies to enforce the theoretical framework of 
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the study. The Anthrax event of 2001, the Ebola epidemic of 2014, and the current Zika 
outbreak are explored in this study in addition to the involvement of the CDC in each 
contagion event.  
 Beginning with the case of Anthrax, we explore America’s first incident of 
bioterrorism. This event occurred just weeks after the September 11th terrorist attacks 
where wounds were still fresh and citizens had a heightened awareness of the risk of 
terrorism. The CDC quickly labeled the event a bioterrorism attack and the organization 
remained deeply involved in the event for its entirety. This case study demonstrates 
aspects of the politics of contagion including the creation of risk groups and the usage of 
contagion as a metaphor for fear. The case study explores the fear-based rush on 
Ciprofloxacin and the creation of a Muslim risk group during the attacks. Data analyzed 
and used in this case study include CDC policy briefings and FBI hate-crime statistics. 
Additionally, a theoretical framework is maintained by including relevant scholarly 
works throughout the case study.  
 Moving onto the second case study, we fast-forward 13 years to the Ebola 
epidemic of 2014. This event was mainly concentrated in a few Sub-Saharan nations, but 
also played a limited role in the United States and Europe. Again, the CDC was a strong 
presence in the epidemic and had specific policies developed relating to the event. The 
creation of an African risk group and the birth of a fear-factor via the media are explored 
in this study. Data analyzed include the media coverage of the epidemic by three major 
American news agencies and public opinions obtained from the comment sections of 
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reputable news agencies. Additionally, scholarly theories are sprinkled throughout the 
case study to maintain a theoretical aspect to the text.  
 Finally, we end our journey in the present with the exploration of the current Zika 
outbreak. This case study differs from the previous two in that the phenomena of risk 
regions as opposed to risk groups in explored. Additionally, biopolitics and access to 
abortion are unpacked in the study. Data used include hotel statistics in Zika regions and 
scholarly work to balance out a theoretical framework. This case study is particularly 
interesting as it is the only contagion of the studies that is largely non-lethal. Yet, we still 
see the emergence of moments of tension during the event, which is linked back to the 
theory of power residing in the subtle.  
 The above studies were carefully selected to explore the politics of contagion and 
the power in the subtle. By examining specific CDC policies and the moments of tension 
during the events, we can link the two together via the power in the subtle. This research 
was made possible by major news organizations including CNN, FOX News, and 
MSNBC. Additional sources include Gilt Travel, the FBI, and the CDC policies and 
briefings. Theorists who specialize in power such as Foucault and Nikolas Rose add to 
the discourse in addition to the countless scholars included who focus on the specific 
contagion events. The blend of theoretical scholars coupled with hard data illuminates the 
politics of contagion and demonstrates how relevant Foucault’s theory on power still is to 
this day.   
Anthrax in America: Bioterrorism & the Muslim Community 
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 In 2001, a series of events shattered the idyllic image of America that many 
American’s held. On September 11th of 2001, hijacked commercial airliners slammed 
into The World Trade Center, The Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania killing 
thousands of civilians in the deadliest terror attack in the history of the United States. Al-
Qaeda, an extremist group headed by Osama Bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the 
attack and the United States marched into two wars in the Middle East. The ensuing wars 
coupled with the 9/11 attacks led to many instances of bias against the Muslim-American 
community, which we still see the effects of today.  
 One major event in 2001 that is often neglected is the Anthrax attacks that 
terrorized the East Coast of the United States for the latter part of 2001. The Anthrax 
attacks of 2001 were the first instance of a bioterrorism attack on the United States, and 
this contagion event created moments of tension that still resonate today. The CDC was a 
major presence in the Anthrax attack investigations, which as a result, aided in two major 
moments of tension. Anthrax as a metaphor for fear and the creation of the Muslim 
community as a risk group that owned responsibility for the Anthrax attacks were major 
consequences of the contagion event, which the CDC played a role. The data in this case 
study will illuminate the Anthrax fear that gripped America and the consequences the 
Muslim community faced as a result. Before we delve too deeply into this case study, it is 
important to properly unpack Anthrax and the climate in America during the fall of 2001.  
 History of Anthrax & its Use in 2001 
 Though the Anthrax attacks of 2001 were an unprecedented use of biological 
warfare, Anthrax itself is not a new phenomenon. Anthrax is an infectious disease caused 
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by gram-positive, rod-shaped bacteria known as Bacillus Anthracis, which dates as far 
back as biblical times (CDC.gov: 2015). Anthrax appears in the Book of Exodus via the 
fifth and sixth plagues inflicted on Egypt, which included the death of livestock and boils 
(Sternbach: 2003). From the Middle Ages to modern day, cases of Anthrax have 
continued to emerge and infect new hosts. In the 18th and 19th centuries, cases of 
inhalation Anthrax commonly occurred in mills where workers were exposed to 
contaminated animal fibers (Sternbach: 2003). Depending on the form of Anthrax, 
symptoms can include nausea, headache, fever, trouble breathing, shock, and other 
complications that can lead to mortality if untreated (Mayo Clinic: 2015). While cases of 
Anthrax occurred naturally for centuries, nations would soon discover the power of 
cultivating and weaponizing biological agents.  
 During the Cold War, an Anthrax contagion emerged killing dozens of Russians. 
In April of 1979, a total of 94 cases of human Anthrax, both gastrointestinal and 
cutaneous, occurred near a Soviet military microbiology facility in Sverdlovsk 
(Sternbach: 2003). Of the 94 cases, 64 were fatal, and the Soviet government blamed the 
outbreak on tainted meat sold via the black market (McNeill 2010: 45). However, an 
international team of researchers that later investigated the outbreak concluded: “an 
unintended release of Anthrax spores in aerosol form from a biological weapons facility 
had descended on the city” (McNeill 2010: 45).   
 Anthrax, along with Smallpox and other deadly diseases has been heavily 
researched and cultivated for weapons purposes by governments across the globe for 
decades. However, there have been no instances of widespread use of Anthrax by 
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governments engaging in war. In fact, in 1980, Phillip Brachman of the CDC published a 
review of inhalation Anthrax dismissing any cause of concern against the threat of the 
disease. The report illustrated a decline in case of Anthrax in America during the 20th 
century and concluded that Anthrax was “now primarily of historical interest” 
(Sternbach: 2003). Unfortunately, the CDC’s dismissal of the threat of Anthrax would be 
proven wrong in the fall of 2001 during America’s first bioterror attack. 
 Nearly 3,000 civilians were killed on September 11th, 2001 in the deadliest terror 
attack on U.S. soil. Shortly after the attacks, the intelligence community determined that 
9/11 hijackers were affiliated with the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. Many Americans 
were in a state of shock and feared that more attacks could be on the way. The sense of 
unease rose with the subsequent Anthrax attacks and the crash of American Airlines 
Flight 587, which eventually was proved to be the result of mechanic issues as opposed to 
terrorism. However, the Anthrax outbreak that stumped investigators for years following 
the attacks was a terrorist attack that elevated the existing tension with the Muslim-
American community 
 The first case of Anthrax contracted via the attack was diagnosed on October 4th, 
2001. Robert Stevens, a tabloid photo editor at American Media, came in contact with a 
white powdery substance later determined to be Anthrax via mail (CCR 2002: 1). At this 
point, Anthrax was virtually unknown by many U.S. doctors. So much so that the first 
two Floridian case, Robert Stevens and Ernesto Blanco, initially were misdiagnosed as 
pneumonia (CCR 2002: 6). While there was understandably a lot of confusion 
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surrounding the outbreak at the local level, the control and understanding of the attack 
was not much better at the health governance level.  
 The CDC scrambled to assess the damage of the outbreak and make 
recommendations to keep the American public safe. As the weeks went on and fall turned 
to winter, 22 civilians would contract the Anthrax contagion; 5 of which would perish.  
During this time, the public’s fear exponentially grew. A biological attack on America 
seemed to be something out of a Hollywood movie for many Americans, so fear and 
panic were a natural reaction to an unnatural event. Fear is a powerful tool that has the 
power to dramatically alter the behavior of those exposed to something they deem 
frightening. A close friend described her experiences living in the DC area during the 
Beltway Sniper killings.  
“It was crazy…I mean, people were obviously scared. No one knew where the shots were coming 
from, and since many of the attacks happened while people were walking to their cars, you saw 
people start to zig zag…like with an alligator. You would pull into a Macy’s parking lot, and all 
you would see is people holding their shopping bags and running in a zig zag to and from their 
cars. Everyone did it. I did it…. That’s just what they said we should do so now it seems crazy 
but when you’re scared you’ll do strange things to protect yourself” (Akiyama: 2016) 
Fear certainly is a powerful emotion that can affect the ways in which individuals cope. 
The Anthrax attacks of 2001 are no exception, and the actions of the CDC had 
consequences that influenced the fear-factor mentality during the outbreak. 
In Cipro We Trust 
 In Cipro we trust, a line made famous by Tom Brokaw during his nightly news 
program serves as a key feature of the Anthrax attacks. In perhaps what is the most 
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tangible example of a fear-factor was the mass antibiotic frenzy that enveloped the public 
during the weeks of the attacks. During the 2001 Anthrax attacks, the CDC recommended 
the use of the antibiotics Ciprofloxacin and Doxycycline as first-line therapy (CDC.gov: 
2001). The typical treatment for an individual with cutaneous Anthrax was a 7-10 day 
regimen of the antibiotic, but cases affiliated with the bioterrorism attacks were 
recommended to remain on antibiotics for 60 days (CDC.gov: 2001). Sixty days is a long 
time to remain on an antibiotic and is typically reserved for serious illnesses such as 
Lyme disease. Given the serious nature of Anthrax and high mortality rate, it is 
understandable that the CDC recommended the antibiotics for an extended period. 
 However, the recommendation of the CDC created a large demand for 
Ciprofloxacin. Pharmacies located in areas in close proximity to the attacks saw a 
significant rise in Ciprofloxacin prescriptions. Both Walgreens in Florida and CVS and 
Rite Aid in New York City reported a large spike in Ciprofloxacin sales during the 
attacks (Petersen: 2001). In fact, sales were so high at some Walgreens that some stores 
ran out of the drug and were not able to restock for up to two days (Petersen: 2001). Also, 
Merck-Medco reported a sizable increase in Ciprofloxacin prescriptions during the 
attacks. Before September 11th, the company filled an average of 8,000 to 10,000 
Ciprofloxacin prescriptions per day (Petersen: 2001). But, during the Anthrax attacks the 
number grew to 12,000-14,000 per day and peaked at 18,000 per day after NBC 
announced that one of its employees had contracted Anthrax (Petersen: 2001). 
 As for the CDC, the agency illuminated the extent of Ciprofloxacin usage during 
the attacks in a November 2001 report. According to the CDC, approximately 32,000 
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individuals were prescribed antibiotics to guard against Anthrax, but only 5,000 people 
were believed to be in need of the antibiotics (CCR 2002: 54). Additionally, one in five 
people prescribed the Ciprofloxacin regimen reported non-lethal side effects (CCR 2002: 
54). Non-lethal side effects of Ciprofloxacin include sun sensitivity, rash, and diarrhea, 
but there are a few more concerning and potentially lethal effects of the drug. According 
to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), serious side effects of Ciprofloxacin 
include an increased risk of seizures, allergic reactions causing difficulty breathing or 
closing of the throat, rupture of a tendon, and severe tissue inflammation of the colon 
(FDA.gov: 2015). The elderly and those with existing mental illnesses are at an elevated 
risk of adverse effects to the drug, which has a well-documented history of serious effects 
(Krucoff: 2001). 
 One of the most famous cases is that of Diane Ayres who woke up delirious in an 
emergency room six hours after taking her first Ciprofloxacin dose for a urinary tract 
infection (Krucoff: 2001). Ayres has since been diagnosed with manic-depressive illness, 
which was triggered by the antibiotic (Krucoff: 2001). Lisa Baldwin also took a 
prescribed Ciprofloxacin dose for a urinary tract infection and has since battled many 
negative side effects. Since taking the medication, Baldwin experiences chronic blurred 
vision and muscle pain, which has left her unable to work or play with her grandchildren 
(Krucoff: 2001). The above cases highlight the dangerous nature of Ciprofloxacin, and 
the pause health government agencies should give to recommending such a drug.  
 Scholars also condemned the rush on Ciprofloxacin during the outbreak. Daniel 
Freidlin in his text Just Say No: The Cipro Craze and Managed Care, highlights the 
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downside of mass antibiotic prescription. Freidlin states, “The more people who don’t 
have bacterial infections take antibiotics, the less effective the drugs are when treating 
real problems, including tuberculosis, pneumonia, and bad colds” (Freidlin: 2002). 
Furthermore, Freidlin estimates thousands of Americans treated themselves with 
Ciprofloxacin during the 2001 attacks out of fear and without reporting the use to the 
CDC (Freidlin: 2002). Freidlin’s exploration of drug resistance is especially important 
given the growing concern over superbugs.  
 A superbug is a highly aggressive bacteria or infection that is resistant to 
treatment by most or all antimicrobials. Megan Johnstone discusses the rise of superbugs 
and the moral significance of antimicrobial resistance. Johnstone cites a 2000 WHO 
warning that stated the misuse of antimicrobials over many decades put the world at risk 
of returning to a “pre-antibiotic age” (Johnstone 2016: 2079). Additionally, the WHO 
warned, “Diseases caused by drug resistant microorganisms pose a more deadly threat to 
human life than war” (Johnstone 2016: 2079). In her text, Johnstone highlights the 
“growing threat to human life” posed by superbugs and explores the moral dilemmas 
posed by reckless antibiotic use (Johnstone 2016: 2080). 
 Thus, we can unpack a moment of tension birthed from Ciprofloxacin usage 
during the 2001 attacks. During the attacks, the evidence yields a dramatic spike in 
Ciprofloxacin prescriptions. While some of the adverse effects of the drugs were 
displayed immediately in the form of muscle pain and other ailments, the role of 
excessive Ciprofloxacin use contributing to future superbugs is not yet known. While 
Ciprofloxacin is still an effective drug in many cases, a superbug outbreak in 2015 
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illuminated the effect of overutilization of antibiotics. In less than a year, 243 cases of 
shigella sonnei were diagnosed in the United States (RT.com: 2016). According to the 
CDC, 90 percent of the shigella sonnei bacteria were resistant to Ciprofloxacin, which 
highlights the issue of overutilization of antibiotics. When recommending an antibiotic, it 
is paramount to anticipate both the immediate concerns and the issues that could arise 
down the road. The overuse of antibiotics, both during the 2001 Anthrax attacks and in 
subsequent contagions is a moment of tension that holds the power to create superbugs 
and diminish the utility of our antibiotic stock. 
 Now, one cannot argue the recommendation of the CDC concerning the usage of 
Ciprofloxacin in Anthrax related cases. However, the CDC’s policy aided in the fear-
factor surrounding the outbreak not because of what it recommended, but what it omitted 
from its reports. In each of its briefings on the outbreak, the CDC was silent on the 
rampant and unnecessary use of Ciprofloxacin and other antibiotics. Not once, in the 
numerous Anthrax reports or briefings did the CDC express concern or try to quell the 
growing abuse of antibiotics. The closest the CDC engaged on the matter was during a 
press briefing on November 14th, 2001. An excerpt is provided below. 
Question from Ira Dreyfus with AP Radio:  “I've heard from patients who say that conditions 
that they used to have treated with Cipro are no longer being treated with Cipro because 
doctors are saying they can't get it because all the Cipro's going to anthrax, and I'm kind 
of curious to see what you folks might know about that?” 
Response from Dr. Gerberding of the CDC: “With respect to your question about access to 
Ciprofloxacin, there are ongoing episodes of antibiotics shortage that we've been experiencing in 
the United States over the past several years for a variety of reasons. The supply of Ciprofloxacin 
that we have access to through vendors and through the stockpile suggest to us that there's no 
issue of shortage. There have been localized examples where antibiotics have been hoarded, 
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particularly after the 9-11 World Trade Center crisis in New York City. For a period of there were 
some folks there that had difficulty getting Ciprofloxacin from their local pharmacy. But, in 
general, the supply of these drugs is keeping up with the demand. We are also putting more 
emphasis on using Doxycycline as a drug for prophylaxis of B. anthracis exposure because the 
organism is sensitive to Doxycycline, just as sensitive as it is to Ciprofloxacin, and we don't use 
Doxycycline for a lot of other conditions. So we can preserve and protect our supply of 
Ciprofloxacin, but, more importantly, preserve and protect other bacterial susceptibility to it 
(CDC.gov: November 2001). 
Essentially, the CDC dismisses the blame of a shortage of Ciprofloxacin and attributes 
shortages multiple causes. Furthermore, the CDC acknowledges some individuals might 
have had trouble acquiring the antibiotic at their local pharmacy, but that the overall 
supply was still keeping up with demand. Later in the briefing when a reporter asked if it 
was wise to give out the drug so widely given the possibility of adverse events, shortages, 
and side effects; the CDC responded, “We don’t want to be using these drugs, willy-nilly, 
or unnecessarily” (CDC.gov: November 2001). 
 However, on the recommendation of the CDC, the antibiotics were given out 
unnecessarily. Again, according to the CDC 32,000 people were given Ciprofloxacin 
with only 5,000 determined to be truly in need of the antibiotic. This means that nearly 85 
percent of the patients unnecessarily were prescribed and consumed the medication. 
Now, some may think the over-prescription is not a big deal, but we must remember the 
powerful nature of the drug. David Flockhart, chief of clinical pharmacology at the 
Indiana University School of Medicin, describes Ciprofloxacin as “a big gun whose 
benefits outweigh its risks in certain circumstances” (Krucoff: 2001). Ciprofloxacin is a 
dangerous drug for certain individuals, which was recommended and prescribed in mass 
quantities by the CDC during the outbreak.  
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 The CDC’s communication concerning Anthrax and Ciprofloxacin was a moment 
of tension, unintentionally created by the CDC, which had tangible effects on supply and 
overutilization. This moment of tension highlights the power in the subtle and relates to 
Foucault’s theory of power. Foucault states, “Power is not something that is acquired, 
seized, or shared, something that one holds onto or allows to slip away; power is 
exercised from innumerable points” (Foucault 1978: 94). Thus, the innumerable nature of 
power dictates its movement through every ebb and flow of life and its residency in every 
arena of life. Since power is everywhere, we can say that there is as much power in the 
communication we use as with what we omit from our communication. Using Foucault’s 
theory of power we see the CDC as an agent of power because of the knowledge it holds 
and shares. In its communication and policies concerning Ciprofloxacin, a subtle power 
emerged, which influenced a fear-induced hoarding of the drug and potentially influenced 
long-term effects on the birth of superbugs. 
 While it is understandable to use Ciprofloxacin to treat a contagion as aggressive 
as Anthrax, the CDC created a moment of tension by not properly communicating with 
the public. Again, not a single briefing from the CDC on the Anthrax outbreak sought to 
combat the over-prescription and hoarding of the antibiotic. Though there are no deaths 
known that are linked to the antibiotic use during the outbreak, we can see the danger that 
was birthed from the CDC’s policies and subsequent lapse in communication. As 
discussed, many pharmacies reported shortages of Ciprofloxacin during the fall of 2001 
with some pharmacies running out of the drug for as long as two days. It is possible that 
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because of the shortages, patients who truly needed Ciprofloxacin for ailments unrelated 
to Anthrax went without treatment.  
 During times of crisis, proper communication is key in avoiding moments of 
tension. The CDC and its Anthrax policies were effective concerning those exposed to 
the disease. However, its lack of initiative in quelling public concerns and proper 
antibiotic education to the general public led to a dangerous situation. With an absence of 
guidance on the risks associated with unnecessary antibiotic usage, a perfect storm 
occurred during the outbreak that strained medication supplies and jeopardized the health 
of countless healthy, non-exposed citizens. The absence of proper communication also 
influenced the second major area of tension during the outbreak, which was the creation 
of a Muslim risk group. 
Fear, Risk, Contagion & Muslims in America 
 The Muslim community in America became a risk group on September 11th, 2001 
when Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists’ murdered nearly 3,000 civilians. Since the 9/11 
attacks, many Muslim-Americans with no affiliation with terror networks experienced 
bias and hate crimes committed against them. Now, the CDC cannot be blamed for the 
atrocities committed against the Muslim community post 9/11. However, the way the 
CDC handled the investigation and its correspondence with the public likely had the 
unintended consequence of aiding in the creation of a Muslim risk group. One of the 
main areas of concern is the language the CDC used during the investigation, and the 
power language has to influence individuals.  
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 Bioterrorism and terrorism became key terms during the CDC investigations and 
briefings. On October 25th, 2001, Julie Gerberding of the CDC described the outbreak as 
frightening; “This is a biological attack and we have no experience with this” (CCR 
2002: 44). The terms bioterrorism, terrorism, attack, suspicious and other charged terms 
were rampant in briefings. The chart below highlights some of the language use in CDC 
briefings during the attacks. 
    
Figure 1: CDC Frequency of Charged Language Use 
The above chart illustrates the frequency of commonly used charged terminology in CDC 
briefings during the outbreak. We can see the term “suspicious” trailed off early on in 
CDC briefings peaking the week of October 26th with nine occurrences. However, 
“terrorism” and “bioterrorism” rose steadily during the attacks peaking the week of 
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November 16th with 20 occurrences. The prevalence of the term “terrorism” in CDC 
briefings is important because of the specific connotation of the term during that period. 
 Using Foucault’s theory that power is everywhere means power also resides in the 
language we use. The power of language and charged language is discussed by Newman 
and Genevieve Birk in Counterbalance: Gendered Perspectives on Writing and 
Language. Birk states, “Before expressed in words, our knowledge both inside and 
outside, is influenced by the principle of selection and the principle of selection 
determines which facts we take in” (Logan 1997: 184) The words we select hold power 
and usage of charged language “shapes our attitudes and values even without our 
conscious knowledge” (Logan 1997: 191). Essentially, Birk argues language shapes our 
knowledge and conscious and charged language can impact individuals regardless of 
their awareness. We can link Birk’s theory of charged language to the prominence of 
charged language in the CDC briefings. Bioterrorism, attack, and risk may have been 
realities concerning Anthrax in 2001, but these terms hold power. These terms can embed 
in the psyche of those exposed and conjure images of an assailant without examining all 
the facts.  
 Remember, only weeks before Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists committed a massive 
terrorist act on U.S. soil and in the following weeks the media and government focused 
on the connection between terrorism and certain Middle Eastern nations. It is important to 
note that not once during the Anthrax investigations were there evidence of Al-Qaeda as 
the perpetrator of the bioterrorism attacks. Yet, we see numerous examples of 
government officials planting the seed of Al-Qaeda involvement in the mind of the 
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public. On whether the Anthrax attacks had a connection to Al-Qaeda, John Ashcroft 
responded, “We should consider this potential that it is linked” (CCR 2002: 28). 
President Bush is quoted, “We have no hard data yet, but it is clear that Bin Laden is a 
man who is an evil man…I wouldn’t put it past them…he and his spokesmen are 
bragging about how they hope to inflict more pain on our country (CCR 2002: 31). And, 
Tommy Thompson, of HHS, described a “well-financed terrorist group” as having the 
potential to concentrate the Anthrax (CCR 2002: 34). 
 During the numerous instances of government officials hinting at Al-Qaeda 
involvement, the CDC remained silent. The CDC was focused on the medical side of the 
investigation and deflected questions pertaining to the criminal investigation. In a press 
briefing on November 15th, 2001, a reporter asked if the CDC had any comment or 
reaction to the news of several federal officials leaning towards a “lone nut” source for 
the Anthrax attacks (CDC.gov: November 2001). The CDC responded that it was not 
focusing on that particular aspect of the investigation and that the criminal aspect was 
more of the FBI’s domain (CDC.gov: November 2001). While it is understandable that 
the CDC desired to remain neutral on the criminal aspect of the attack, neutrality left a 
gray area as to the responsible party.  
 Even with numerous individuals showing the unlikelihood of an Al-Qaeda 
relationship with the attacks, the CDC remained neutral. Jeanne Guilleman, an Anthrax 
expert, claimed “Neither cases look like full-blown bioterrorism…it looks more like a 
Unabomber” situation (CCR 2002: 27). Intelligence officials at the CIA also expressed 
doubt concerning international involvement; a senior official is quoted, “Everything 
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seems to lean to a domestic source. Nothing seems to fit with an overseas terrorist type 
operation” (CCR 2002: 45). However, the CDC remained relatively silent and continued 
to leave all options open. Jeffery Koplan, the CDC director, claimed the deliberate release 
of the Anthrax by terrorists was one of the several possibilities under investigation; he 
stated, “We have that on the list” (CCR 2002: 18).  
 Unfortunately, the combination of charged terminology such as “terrorism” 
coupled with neutrality regarding the responsible party aided in creating a Muslim risk 
group during this time. Again, the CDC is not directly responsible for the risk group 
creation as a number of factors went into creating the risk population. However, there are 
subtle consequences in the language used by the CDC. By remaining neutral and 
frequently using charged language, the CDC sent out a message to the public that there 
was a chance that foreign terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda were responsible for the 
Anthrax attacks. Leaving a gray area concerning the perpetrator aided in allowing the 
public to cast their critical gaze on the Muslim-American population. 
 Again, we can cite Foucault’s theory on power because if “power is everywhere,” 
then it also resides in the silence and the ambiguity of the CDC briefings. Power certainly 
lived in the CDC’s neutrality and prevalence of using charged language in its briefings, 
but there certainly wasn’t intent to create a Muslim risk group. We can examine the work 
of Franz Fanon to unpack another form of power, which aided in the creation of the 
Muslim risk group. In Black Skin White Masks, Fanon explores the theory of otherization 
and cites the experience of a black man living in a white man’s world.  
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 Fanon describes the white world as “the only honorable one,” which barred him 
from participation (Fanon 1986: 114). He linked his “blackness” to a “uniform” of which 
battered him down with “tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetichism, racial 
defects, and slave ships (Fanon 1986: 112-14). Fanon is describing the otherization of a 
black man in a white society. For Fanon, otherization is an experience where he, the 
minority in a predominantly white society, is labeled and falsely categorized because of 
his skin color. Otherization is a form of power to Fanon because it allows an entire group 
to have their realities created based on skin color. 
 Fanon’s theory of otherization can be linked to other groups including Muslims 
during 2001. All of the 19 hijackers on September 11th were from the same region and 
shared a similar race and features. Though not all Arabs are Muslim, many are perceived 
by Westerners to be Muslim because of their appearance and otherization. Fanon 
explains, “The Jew can be unknown in his Jewishness…he is not wholly what he is…he 
can sometimes go unnoticed” (Fanon 1986: 115). According to Fanon, a Jewish man can 
go unnoticed because his skin color, if white, does not subject him to the same 
otherization that it would to someone of another skin color. Thus, since many Arabs have 
a complexion that otherizes them, Western society can otherize them as Muslims.  
 Much like Fanon’s experience of linkage to terrible stereotypes such as 
cannibalism, Arabs can experience false stereotypes because of otherization. Since 
September 11th, many have experienced bias because of an otherization, which labels 
them as an extremist or terrorist. During the Anthrax attacks, many hate crimes were 
committed against Muslims. On September 27th, 2001, a note was left on a Yemeni man’s 
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windshield saying “we’re going to kill all (expletive) Arabs” and two days later the man 
was shot to death (Southern Poverty Law Center: 2011). Also, on November 2nd, 2001, a 
Seattle mosque was set ablaze and on November 7th, 2001, three white men shouted 
racial slurs and fired gunshots at a man they believed was of Arab descent in California 
(Southern Poverty Law Center: 2011). To show fully the extent of the abuse directed at 
the Muslim community in 2001, we can explore the chart below.  
Figure 2: FBI Hate Crime Statistics (1999-2004) 
 The above chart illustrates the FBI records of hate crimes committed against 
Catholics, Protestants, and those of the Islam faith over the course of a five-year period. 
While hate crimes committed against all three groups remained relatively low in 1999 
and 2000, hate crimes against those of Islam faith skyrocketed to over 500 cases. The 
spike in attacks against those of Islam faith coincides with both the 9/11 attacks and the 
Anthrax attacks, which many suspected Al-Qaeda to be responsible. While the CDC is 
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not responsible for the hate crimes against the Muslim community in 2001, I hope to 
show the linkage between the language of the CDC and the moment of tension, which 
birthed a Muslim risk group. 
  Unfortunately, many government officials including President Bush attempted to 
link Al Qaeda to the Anthrax attacks. Though there was no evidence supporting claims of 
foreign terror involvement, the CDC remained neutral when it could have easily said how 
insignificant the chance of Al Qaeda involvement was. The CDC’s neutrality and charged 
language were not the sole cause of the Muslim risk group creation nor was it the reason 
behind the hate crimes committed following the attacks, but it was an aggravating agent 
that ultimately aided in the alienation of the Muslim-American community. It is also 
worth noting that though many suspected Al-Qaeda involvement in the Anthrax attacks, 
beliefs of foreign terror involvement were eventually squashed. In 2010, the FBI closed 
the Anthrax case and named Bruce Ivins the prime suspect. Ivins, a Caucasian 
government employee, and U.S. citizen, killed himself in 2008 (Shane: 2010). Ivins had 
no known affiliation with any overseas terror organizations, and it appears he acted alone 
in the attacks. The attacks were ultimately the work of a “lone nut”, a term the CDC shied 
away from in spite of mounting evidence.  
 Overall, the CDC conducted a thorough investigation and did a fine job 
considering the uncharted territory of a bioterrorism case. The purpose analyzing the 
2001 one Anthrax attacks isn’t necessarily to criticize the CDC’s handling of the 
investigation. Rather, it is to explore the subtle consequences of CDC policies and how 
they have to power to cultivate moments of tension. Certainly, the CDC did not intend for 
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their language and recommendations to create a fear-based rush on Ciprofloxacin or aid 
in the creation of a Muslim risk group. However, without substantial education on the 
nature of the disease and risks of unnecessary antibiotic use, many pharmacies reported 
shortages of Ciprofloxacin and sales of the drugs skyrocketed in the weeks of the attacks. 
Additionally, the charged language used in briefings coupled with evasiveness and 
neutrality regarding the responsible party did not help the tensions with the Muslim-
American community.  
 These moments, though unintended, highlight the power that exists in the subtle. 
Foucault illustration of the existence of power in all facets of society resonates with the 
CDC’s handling of the 2001 Anthrax attacks. Because power exists everywhere, it can 
interconnect with other areas of power including Fanon’s otherization. The constant flow 
of power creates subtle moments where tensions can emerge, especially during times of 
crisis or fear. The fear surrounding the Anthrax outbreak and the moments of tension that 
occurred are not black and white issues. They are shades of gray with many factors that 
facilitated their creation.  
 There is power in the subtle and the subtle actions of the CDC, though 
unintended, did create moments of tension for the public. The CDC did acknowledge the 
investigation had some issues. In responding to criticism, the CDC is quoted, “People are 
somewhat surprised we’re learning this on a day to day basis…you always wish you 
knew on day one what you know on day twenty” (CCR 2002: 44). The CDC does not 
make mention of any of the moments of tension that were birthed out the attacks or the 
subsequent investigation. Ultimately, the CDC’s policies and handling of the Anthrax 
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investigation is a testament to the power of the subtle and the unintended consequences 
that can come out of simple decisions. Unfortunately, though unintended, these 
consequences have the power to create panic and damage domestic communities and 
those beyond U.S. borders. 
 The Ebola Epidemic of 2014: Otherization & Distrust 
 On December 26, 2013, a two-year-old Guinean boy fell ill with a mysterious 
disease, which included symptoms of vomiting and fever; and two days later he was dead 
(WHO: 2014). It would later be determined that the toddler was patient zero in the deadly 
2014 Ebola outbreak that claimed the lives of over 11,000 people. The epidemic birthed a 
panic, which enveloped the globe, particularly the West. Moments of tension during the 
outbreak included fear of the African other, bias, calls for nationalism, and government 
distrust; and these were central features in America during the outbreak. Much like the 
Anthrax attacks of 2001, the CDC was deeply involved in the Ebola epidemic of 2014, 
and its policy contributed to some of the above moments of tension. Before we delve too 
deeply into the CDC policy and its aftermath, let us explore the origins of the outbreak 
and spread of the virus.  
 Ebola is a virus that is believed to be airborne and often initially contracted by 
humans via bats (CDC.gov: 2014). There are five strains of the Ebola virus, all of which 
highlight the African nations prone to the virus including the Sudan Ebola virus and the 
Côte d’Ivoire Ebola virus (CDC.gov: 2014). Symptoms of the virus include fever, severe 
headache, fatigue, stomach pain, vomiting, and unexplained bleeding (CDC.gov: 2014). 
Much like Anthrax in 2001, Ebola was not a new phenomenon in 2014. The first known 
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case of Ebola occurred in Zaire in 1976 (Harrod: 2014). Since 1976, sporadic outbreaks 
of Ebola have occurred in Africa, but never to the extent of the 2014 epidemic.   
 After the Guinean toddler died from Ebola virus complications, the disease 
quickly spread throughout the village and greater Guinea. The disease ravaged Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, prompting the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
involvement. In August of 2014, the WHO advised that the Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa constituted an “extraordinary event and public health risk to other states” 
(WHO.int: 2014). Additionally, the WHO recommended that a “coordinated international 
response” to the disease was essential to combat the international threat of the Ebola virus 
(WHO.int: 2014). Just weeks after the WHO advised on the growing international threat 
of the virus, the disease arrived in the West and panic ensued.  
 Initially, the Ebola virus arrived in America in a controlled manner. On behalf of 
the United States government, infected American humanitarians were airlifted from the 
epicenter of the outbreak and brought to the United States for treatment. Though the 
humanitarians were treated without incident, there was growing concern regarding flights 
arriving from Africa into the West. Throughout the epidemic, the CDC remained firm on 
its policy concerning travel. The CDC called for “active monitoring” of travelers from 
Ebola hot zones, which included daily reporting of measured temperatures and Ebola 
symptoms for 21 days after the last potential exposure (CDC.gov: 2014). However, the 
CDC was against a travel ban, which would hinder the movement of people within the 
most heavily affected areas. Dr. Thomas Frieden, Director of the CDC, posted a lengthy 
statement on FOX News during the epidemic concerning why a travel ban was the wrong 
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call: “A travel ban is not the right answer.  It’s simply not feasible to build a wall – 
virtual or real – around a community, city, or country. A travel ban would essentially 
quarantine the more than 22 million people that make up the combined populations of 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.” (FOX News: 2014). The CDC’s policy regarding 
travel during the epidemic and its aversion to preventing to a travel ban became a major 
point of contention of the media. In turn, this policy of the CDC birthed the first moment 
of tension, which included a media fear-factor, calls of an inept CDC, and a government 
powerless to stop an impending deadly outbreak on American soil.   
The Ebola Media Frenzy 
 The media coverage of the Ebola epidemic was inescapable. During the peak 
months of the disease and especially after the first Ebola patient was airlifted to America, 
Ebola segments dominated Fox News, NBC, and CNN. Additionally, during this period 
Ebola articles were found in nearly every major newspaper. Initially, the coverage 
focused on the rising death tolls in Africa and how difficult it was becoming to manage 
the disease. However, as the disease progressed and awareness of its threat to the West 
increased, the media’s coverage became more intense and critical of the CDC. Below is a 
sampling of media coverage of the epidemic.  
Date News Agency & 
Commentator  
Statement 
 
7/3/14 CNN- Hala Gorani “(Ebola) is a really big problem” 
“No cure…90% death rate”  
 
8/3/14 Fox News- Dr. Glover “We should be concerned” “WHO 
declared (Ebola) an international 
public health emergency” 
discusses a CDC plan for 
”quarantine”  
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10/3/14 FOX News- Andrea 
Tantaros 
“We (US) are not equipped to 
handle this” “In these countries 
(African) they do not believe in 
traditional medical care”  “Witch 
doctor…Santeria.” 
10/6/14 CNN- Dr. Alexander 
Garza 
Ebola is the ”ISIS of biological 
agents” “spreads throughout and 
kills innocent people. “National 
security issue …treat it like a form 
of terrorism …protect the 
homeland (America)…protect the 
American public.”  
10/7/14 Fox News-Gretchen 
Carlson 
Suggests we should not trust the 
government (CDC) to handle 
Ebola because they have made 
errors in other areas (secret 
service slip up) “people scared 
that government agencies 
responsible (to handle Ebola) 
might not be up to the task”  
10/10/14 CNN- Rand Paul “We have underplayed the risk of 
this (Ebola)…not unreasonable to 
suspend commercial 
flights…worldwide contagion”  
10/11/14 FOX News- Elizabeth 
Hasselbeck 
“Why are we letting people in” 
“secure the borders” shut down 
flights” “temporarily seal off 
border” 
10/13/14 CNN-Interview with 
various neighbors of 
Ebola Victim 
“Pretty alarming…pretty 
concerned now” (James Guajardo: 
neighbor) “owner of local gym 
says clients are on edge” (CNN 
reporter) “I’m nervous…pray for 
me” (Jacob Deluna: electrician that 
worked on nurse’s neighbors 
apartment) “It’s scary….seems like 
it may be more contagious than 
the doctors are saying” (Clint 
Rabe: local electrician) 
10/13/14 Fox News-Bill 
O’Reilly  
Why is the government not 
protecting us (from Ebola)? “Very 
contagious disease” “very 
worrisome” “there is no 
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compelling reason why West 
Africans should be admitted into 
the USA when there is an Ebola 
epidemic raging there” “this is a 
national security issue” “CDC 
director is not being candid…he 
should resign” Ebola policies are 
“stupid” “irresponsible” and put 
“Americans at risk” O’Reilly is 
asking for “common sense” 
 
10/14/14 Fox News- Laura 
Ingraham with the 
hosts of Fox & 
Friends 
Laura Ingraham condemns Tom 
Frieden (CDC director)  “he shrugs 
off common sense” “best way to 
stop this is to stop people from 
coming in…he shrugs that off” 
(Ingraham) “this is deadly 
serious” “American lives are on 
the line” “more concerned with 
how to stop it in West Africa than 
how to stop it here” “had there 
been a travel ban Thomas Duncan 
wouldn’t have gotten into this 
country (America) (Male host Fox 
& Friends) 
10/16/14 Fox News-
Congressmen Ed 
Royce 
“There isn’t an inalienable right to 
travel or tourism to the US….that’s 
a privilege.” “Its common sense to 
issue a time out for visas” “Contain 
it there (Africa) “self-evident”  
10/17/14 MSNBC-Senator 
Dennis Ross 
“Great deal of concern” (CDC 
handling of Ebola) “banning those 
flights” “don’t issue visas to 
travelers abroad” “banning of 
these flights” “We know the 
source” (Africa) “not issuing visas” 
10/19/14 CNN-Ted Cruz “Biggest mistake is we continue to 
allow open air flights from 
countries that have been stricken 
by Ebola” (Cruz) “Common sense” 
(Cruz) “CDC gave her the green 
light to do that”  (Cruz on infected 
nurse boarding a commercial 
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flight) “serious mistake” (Cruz) 
“protect US citizens…stop flights” 
(Cruz to FAA) “basic common 
sense” “epidemic raging” (Cruz) 
“common sense” (Cruz) “stop 
issuing travel visas from Liberia” 
(Cruz) “we should be protecting 
citizens of this country(US)” 
(Cruz) “’public health crisis” 
(Cruz) “we are not protecting our 
borders…doesn’t make sense” 
(Cruz) “we should not be allowing 
non US citizens from these 
countries(Africa) to travel into 
our country…temporarily” (Cruz) 
“outbreak…active and growing 
epidemic” (Cruz) 
11/11/14 MSNBC-Compilation 
of other network 
coverage of the 
outbreak 
“Ebola scares popping up across 
the country” (Megan Kelly) 
“Ebola…mess” (Jeanine Piero) 
“ISIS supporters encouraging the 
use of Ebola as a weapon to kill us 
Westerners” (Unknown blond 
reporter FOX) “Ebola on the backs 
of ISIS” (Unknown male FOX 
reporter) “not self-quarantining” 
(Megan Kelly) “Is Ebola President 
Obama’s Katrina” (Don Lemon 
CNN) “Ebola as Obama’s Katrina” 
(CNN reporter) “many are 
frightened and angry that Ebola 
may spread across the USA” 
(O’Reilly) “panic…you don’t want 
us to panic…I don’t want us to die” 
(Jeanne Piero) 
   
Figure 3: Sampling of Media Discourse Concerning Ebola in 2014 
 Clearly, there is the element of fear throughout the above examples of media 
coverage. Take for example the comments of Andrea Tantaros in which she otherizes the 
African healthcare industry by claiming Africans only use methods of magic to treat 
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disease. Her claims of witchcraft and Santeria in the African health field illustrate both a 
fear factor of an inept African other and convey a false narrative of African culture to the 
audience. Mike McGovern, in his text Bushmeat and the Politics of Disgust, explores a 
similar narrative of a skewed view of African culture. In his text, McGoven analyzes the 
role of Vice Media in the coverage of the Ebola epidemic. In their coverage, bushmeat 
consumption among Africans takes center stage with the central theme of Ebola residing 
in exotic animals, which are then consumed by Africans causing a pandemic that 
“liquefies the victim’s internal organs” (McGovern: 2014). Contained in the media 
coverage is abundant sensationalism and a critical gaze on African culture as people that 
Americans can observe and exclaim, “They eat that?!” (McGovern: 2014). 
 McGovern also discusses the feelings of disgust that consumption of monkeys or 
bats instills in many individuals while the consumption of American game does not 
garner the same horror. As McGovern points out, Western media tends to sensationalize 
and cast a critical gaze on African culture. Much like the Vice coverage, we can see in 
the above chart a number of examples of sensationalism and misinformation that 
otherizes Africans. In the above examples, we can also see a general sense of panic 
including a description of Ebola as the “ISIS of biological agents” that rapidly spreads 
and kills innocent civilians. Sherry Towers and colleagues examined the role of media in 
public fear during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Using Google Trends during the period of 
peak media coverage of the Ebola epidemic, Towers explored users searches of terms and 
phrases including “Ebola,” Do I have Ebola,” and “Ebola symptoms” (Towers: 2015). 
The study yielded a large spike in Google searches for the above phrases during the time 
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of peak media coverage. As we can see in the chart above, the barrage of fear-driven 
language was an ongoing feature of the epidemic. As shown in Tower’s study, the 
coverage of the media has the power to spread the fear of the epidemic throughout the 
public. 
 While fear and otherization were staples of the coverage, another central feature 
of news coverage was open anger towards the CDC’s handling of the epidemic. In many 
of the segments, the news anchors or the interviewees implored for a travel ban, which 
would prevent citizens of West African nations from accessing the United States. One of 
the most vocal critics of the open travel was Ted Cruz who slammed the CDC in a CNN 
interview. Cruz claimed the CDC had made a “serious mistake” by allowing someone 
with Ebola to board a flight. Furthermore, Cruz demanded a halt in the issue of visas and 
travel to the United States from West African nations. In fact, Cruz mentioned the dire 
need for a travel ban over six times in a short interview and slammed the CDC for its lack 
of “common sense” on the issue.  
 Additionally, the media was furious with Tom Frieden and the CDC for its lack of 
stringency in hindering the movement of people from the most heavily affected countries. 
The data shows that much of the media believed the CDC demonstrated a “lack of 
common sense” concerning its handling of the epidemic. At least four of the examples in 
the chart harp on a lack of common sense in the handling of the epidemic, while many 
others refer to the irresponsibility of the government concerning the epidemic. So, from a 
simple CDC policy on travel, we see a moment of tension grow in the form of the 
deterioration of trust between the media and the CDC. 
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 To some, these moments of tension may seem unimportant, especially since the 
media has a history of casting a critical gaze on a given entity during times of crises. 
However, these moments of tension that evolve unintentionally hold the power to morph 
into bigger areas of concern. As demonstrated in the data, the media took off with the 
idea of a necessity for a West African travel ban. Additionally, charged language was 
prevalent during the epidemic, which aided in the growing fear-factor. Unlike during the 
Anthrax attacks where the CDC mainly used the charged language, during the Ebola 
epidemic much of the charged language was used by the media in its coverage of the 
impending danger of the virus and the lack of “common sense” the CDC policies 
demonstrated. 
 We can see many examples of charged language in the above media broadcast 
analysis. From Laura Ingraham’s categorization of a “deadly serious” outbreak that put 
American lives in danger to Jeanine Piero’s claim of ISIS plans to use Ebola to murder 
Westerners, news anchors did not shy away from language that had the potential to instill 
fear in the viewer. We can also explore the use of charged language in print media during 
the epidemic. Below is a month-by-month analysis of the trends of charged language 
used in articles by major news organizations including CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, and 
NBC. 
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Figure 4: Charged Language in Ebola Media Coverage  
 In the above chart, a rise in charged language during the Ebola epidemic is 
illustrated. We can see that the frequency of the word “die” and its synonyms had the 
greatest increase, peaking at over 70 instances in October. “Risk” and its synonyms also 
rose steadily while the term “outbreak” and its synonyms initially rose, but then dropped 
off in October. Die, outbreak, risk, and their synonyms are charged because they are 
based on fear. These words have the power to cultivate panic among their audiences. We 
can look back at Martin Pernick’s Contagion and Culture to solidify the power of 
language. Pernick explored the term contagion and its evolution throughout the years. In 
ancient times, contagion was often associated with negative connotations such as sin or 
grief (Pernick 2002: 860).  
 Throughout history, Pernick shows a constant negative association with the term 
contagion, which is often entangled with “epidemics and panic” (Pernick 2002: 861). 
Much like Pernick’s research of language and the term contagion, modern language also 
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holds power. Each word in the above graph signifies the potential of danger For the 
Western audience the above articles catered to, these words had a subtle power that 
further exaggerated the fear-factor surrounding the epidemic. 
 Within the growing climate of fear was a sense of impending doom for America. 
Articles were littered with a language of death and suffering, while news anchors 
relentlessly pounded the CDC’s handling of the outbreak and demanded a travel ban. The 
CDC expressed numerous times the difficulty of contracting the disease, as it is not an 
airborne contagion. At the same time, the media wondered whether the virus could 
become airborne and discussed the threat of a virus mutation and the potential for more 
deaths (Fox Health: 2016). The CDC frequently mentioned its safety nets in place to 
monitor travelers that could carry the virus while the media asked if bioterrorists could 
harness Ebola to attack America. One article claims that all a terrorist would need to 
make a “dirty bomb” is a bag of vomit, and they would have the power to inflict havoc on 
the American people (Vlahos: 2014). 
 For all the work the CDC did to try to ease the mind of the public, the media 
counteracted with hypothetical situations and claims of CDC recklessness by not 
enforcing a travel ban. Theresa MacPhail, a medical anthropologist, explores the dangers 
of the media induced fear-factor that erupted in 2014. She explains that by hyping up the 
danger of a single disease, other dangers can be neglected. She cites the vast sum of 
money poured into research for a deadly strain of influenza, which she describes as 
“probably good” but MacPhail asks whether we adequately prepared for the spread of 
other dangers like dengue fever or Chikungunya (Horgan: 2014). The same could be said 
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about the 2014 Ebola epidemic. While the epidemic certainly was a concern, the constant 
media attention could have distracted personnel from other diseases that potentially 
risked the lives of civilians.  
 MacPhail criticized the role of media in the 2014 outbreak describing their 
coverage as “not great overall” (Horgan: 2014). She explains that there is “always money 
to be made in fear-mongering” and that though “it is easy to get caught up in the drama of 
outbreaks,” it is important to “take a step back analyze the bigger picture” (Horgan: 
2014). However, as demonstrated in the above data, the media appeared to ignore the 
bigger picture and engage in a large-scale campaign of fear. MacPhail was particularly 
critical of the media fear mongering concerning African culture. The discussion of 
bushmeat, burial practices, and Santeria was described as “cultural problems that 
promoted the spread of Ebola” (Horgan: 2014). With an ongoing campaign of fear in the 
media, which heavily otherized the African people coupled with an abundance of charged 
language, a situation for potential bias began to brew. 
   Though the CDC believed it could effectively monitor traveling through 
temperature readings, the media was skeptical. Many anchors discussed the vast number 
of travelers and the difficulty of monitoring each and every person who enters the United 
States. They claimed that all it would take was a single passenger to slip through the 
cracks and catastrophe could erupt. The moment of tension from the CDC’s travel policy 
reached its tipping point when Thomas Duncan, a Liberian with the Ebola virus, legally 
entered the United States and spread the disease to two Dallas nurses.  
Thomas Duncan & African Risk Group Creation 
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 On September 20, 2014, Thomas Duncan arrived in Texas after flights from 
Belgium and Liberia. A few days prior to his flight, Duncan shared a taxi with a pregnant 
neighbor. During the ride, the woman fainted, prompting Duncan to carry the woman and 
assist her (Gostin: 2014). Duncan did not disclose his encounter with the pregnant 
woman, who died of Ebola shortly after the encounter, to airport officials (Gostin: 2014). 
Shortly after arriving in Dallas, Duncan visited the Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital 
complaining of Ebola-like symptoms and reported his recent travel from Liberia (Gostin: 
2014). Duncan was initially sent home with antibiotics, but after returning a couple of 
days later with deteriorating heath, he was admitted in the hospital and placed in isolation 
(Gostin: 2014). In spite of treatment for the Ebola virus, Thomas Duncan died on October 
8th of 2014, and days later Nurse Amber Vinson and Nurse Nina Pham tested positive for 
the virus.  
 The inevitable Ebola contagion in American society that the media promoted for 
weeks had finally occurred. The media continued its outcry for a travel ban, and the 
public’s anger grew, especially concerning Thomas Duncan. Many were furious at 
Duncan and the CDC for his presence in America, which is demonstrated in the 
following graph.  
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Figure 5: Public Opinions of Thomas Duncan & Ebola in America  
The above graph illustrates a breakdown of discourse found in the comment sections of 
major news articles on Thomas Duncan and his battle with Ebola. An overwhelming 
majority of the sample took a critical view of Duncan. Many referred to Duncan as a 
“liar” who should be prosecuted for bringing the Ebola virus to America, while others 
labeled him as a “selfish man.” Just over 16 percent of respondents placed blame on the 
CDC and government. Many expressed a lack of confidence in the CDC’s ability to 
handle the Ebola epidemic. One commenter believed the head of the CDC should face 
prosecution for bringing Ebola to America, while another claimed the CDC was 
responsible for “bringing disease into America.” 
 Only a little over nine percent of the sample expressed support for Duncan and 
even fewer were supportive of the government and the hospital that cared for Duncan. 
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The vast majority of the sample had harsh words for the all three parties, and racial 
undertones were abundant throughout the analysis. In addition to calling Duncan a liar, 
much of the language describing Duncan gave him a villain-like persona. Described as 
“Ebolaman,” a “despicable individual” that brought Ebola to “an actual civilized 
country,” Duncan was thought by many to be well aware of his sickness and without 
concern for the safety of American citizens. 
 The demonic view of Duncan spread to a generalization of Africa as a whole for 
much of the sample. Africans were described as “losers” and Liberians were believed to 
be diseased from eating “dirty rotten monkeys.” In the following quote, one commenter 
attempts to illustrate the difference between the West and Africa and injects race into his 
argument.  
“Africa was in good shape, socially, economically, etc. when the white colonial powers ran the 
place.  The British and French tried to civilize and uplift the natives.  The Belgians finally got 
their stuff together after a bit of nastiness under King Leopold.  And, when the European colonial 
powers left, they left behind functioning economies and societies. 
Today, except for South Africa, all sub-Saharan black Africa is a giant, violent, dysfunctional 
version of Newark, New Jersey. South Africa is still functioning. Gotta be a reason in there 
somewhere.”  
To the commenter and many in the study, Africans were to blame for Ebola, and it would 
be their cross to bear. Bringing the disease to America was regarded as intentional to 
most and terroristic to many others. The few who expressed support for Duncan tried to 
highlight that Duncan did not know that he was infected with the virus, and that Ebola 
was not only an African virus or concern. Unfortunately, the fear factor surrounding the 
epidemic allowed for the demonization of Duncan and birthed substantial bias towards 
Africans and those perceived of being African.  
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 The demonization of Duncan is the central focus of Emma Cohen’s piece The 
2014 Ebola Epidemic and Racial “Othering.”  Cohen discusses an article written by the 
nephew of the late Thomas Duncan of which the underlying message is “people of color 
receive inferior medical treatment in the United States, and had Thomas Eric Duncan 
been a white man with health insurance, he likely would have survived” the Ebola virus 
(Cohen 2015: 4). Cohen explores the “historical, geographical, and psychological 
circumstances that have created a foundation for racial othering of Africans with relation 
to disease.” (Cohen 2015: 5). As Cohen describes, Duncan and fellow Africans are 
widely “stigmatized” because of a belief that they are somehow different from the “in-
group.” (Cohen 2015: 5).  
 Otherization is not a unique phenomenon to the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Susan 
Sontag, in Illness as Metaphor, links sickness to other. The other is “perceived as morally 
inferior, different, and vulnerable,” which counters how the healthy wish to think of 
themselves (Mongoven: 2014). This otherization and stigmatization would explain the 
outpouring of negativity that Duncan experienced from the public. To the Western 
masses, Duncan was a stranger who did not belong. He was a bearer of disease and 
imminent threat to the lives of United States citizens. 
 While otherization was a growing concern, panic and distrust of the CDC took 
center stage after Amber Vinson, a nurse who contracted Ebola via Thomas Duncan, was 
able to board a commercial flight to Ohio. Before boarding her flight back to Dallas, 
Vinson called the CDC to report her fever of 99.5 and confirm whether she was able to 
travel via air given her care of Thomas Duncan (Davidson: 2014). The day after returning 
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to Dallas, Vinson was diagnosed with the Ebola virus. Frontier Airlines Flight 1143, the 
plane Vinson traveled, flew five more times the following day until Vinson’s diagnosis 
was confirmed (Davidson: 2014). Below is a chart illustrating the public reaction to the 
Vinson case. 
 
  
Figure 6: Public Opinions of Amber Vinson & Ebola in America 
 The above chart illustrates the comments of individuals concerning the Amber 
Vinson case. In this case, the key element of frustration shifts from the patient to the 
agency, which differs from the Thomas Duncan case, where Duncan was the main target 
of critics. The data yielded that 72 percent of respondents took an anti-CDC viewpoint, 
while 25 percent expressed frustration with the patient. Many were dumbfounded that the 
CDC allowed Vinson to fly and played with the title of the CDC calling it the “Can’t do it 
Correct” Center or the “Criminal Debacle Center.” The overall theme of the comments 
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indicated the CDC was “incompetent” and that Dr. Frieden should have been fired 
immediately.  
  Amber Vinson also bore some criticism with respondents calling her “reckless” 
and demanding the revocation of her nursing license. However, the criticism of the 
patient was much less frequent and severe than with Thomas Duncan. Concerning 
Vinson, there were no known racial attacks or attacks on her character. The few who 
criticized her focused on how as a nurse “she should have known better,” but there was 
no belief among respondents that she deliberately boarded the plane knowing she had the 
virus. With Duncan, the criticism was overwhelming and a complete character 
assassination. To the majority, he was a liar who intentionally brought his disease to the 
United States. Racial and anti-African sentiments were common among those who 
criticized Duncan.  
 Much like Edward Said, in his text Orientalism, Thomas Duncan becomes the 
other. According to Said, “The real Orient provoked a writer to his vision; it rarely 
guided it,” which resonates with the case of Thomas Duncan (Said 1979: 22). The West 
determined Duncan’s reality and deemed him a radical other, an agent of disease. 
Duncan’s otherization was a consequence of the politics of contagion because fear 
coupled with policy can create moments of tension. The world saw a similar case play out 
in Canada over ten years earlier. Charles Adeyanju in his text Not in Canada describes 
the case of a Congolese tourist who was suspected of carrying the Ebola virus while 
visiting Canada. The negative scrutiny of the tourist became so intense that a white 
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supremacist group protested in front of the patient’s hospital and distributed anti-
immigration pamphlets (Adeyanju 2010: 34). 
 Both the unnamed Congolese tourist and Thomas Duncan were otherized and 
determined a threat to the ”in-group.” In both cases, there is a common denominator of 
African citizenship and extreme bias. Vinson did experience some harsh words, but it 
mainly revolved around her professionalism as opposed to race. Though Vinson, Duncan, 
and the Congolese tourist were all black, Vinson was a United States citizen. Perhaps, her 
citizenship protected her from the tension of otherization during the outbreak. While 
Vinson did not experience the same level of otherization, the fear surrounding the 
contagion needed another target for the masses to focus on. Now, the target was the CDC 
and those in charge of the organization. 
 The CDC was now the “other” of which the American public determined its 
realities and motivations. Trust eroded and many saw the CDC as an incompetent enemy 
that threatened the public with its incompetence, much like Duncan’s “selfishness” 
threatened the public. We can see that the deterioration of trust and otherization that 
occurred during the Ebola epidemic are moments of tension, which are birthed out of a 
fear-factor. These moments of tension are only further aggravated by the policies of 
health governance agencies like the CDC. Again, there is power in the subtle, and the 
seemingly insignificant or well-intended decisions of the CDC aided in the creation of the 
above moments of tension. 
  By dismissing a travel ban, the CDC created a policy that it believed made the 
disease less of a threat to the countless uninfected individuals trapped in the epicenter of 
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the outbreak. The CDC believed it’s monitoring of the epidemic was sufficient and that 
they would be able to identify infected individuals before they could gain access to the 
United States. However, the CDC underestimated the fear-factor surrounding the 
epidemic and did not anticipate the subsequent moments of tension. The CDC did not 
intend for a character assassination with racial notes of Thomas Duncan, nor did it 
anticipate the backlash after the case of Amber Vinson. But, these moments of friction 
did occur, which highlights the power that lies in the subtle, and the ability for this subtle 
power to impact individuals on a global scale. 
 Whether, the CDC recommended a travel ban or dismissed a ban, it is likely that 
moments of tension would have occurred. However, it is important to plan and have an 
awareness of the moments of tension to minimize any potential negative impacts, which 
the CDC failed to accomplish. Every decision the CDC makes, the language they use, 
and the policies they create all have the subtle power to create moments of tension. In 
Michael Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, claims “the ancient right to take life or let 
live was replaced by the power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 
1978: 138). In other words, Foucault highlights a shift from an explicit power to an 
implicit, subtle power. 
  In the case of Ebola, we see the rise of bias, otherization, and the decay of trust 
with the CDC. Using Foucault’s placement of power, we can categorize these moments 
of tension as the later subtle power. The CDC’s policies did not set out to create 
otherization or the destruction of government trust. However, Foucault’s belief of a subtle 
power is a gateway for the birth of unintended consequences. Foucault explains, “ If 
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genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return of the 
ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the 
species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population” (Foucault 1978: 137). 
Thus, power is everywhere. The masses, the media, the interpretation of policies, and 
throughout every facet of contagion events exists an elusive power that can affect the 
lives of millions of individuals. In the 2014 Ebola epidemics, we saw the subtle power in 
the policies, which caused a trickle down effects to the media and the masses. This subtle 
power ultimately created otherization, bias, and loss of trust.   
 The subtle power during the 2014 Ebola epidemic is also discussed in Akhenaten 
Tankwanchi’s Ebola, Thomas Duncan’s Death, and the Biopolitics of Disposability. 
Tankwanchi explores the implicit bias and black disposability during the epidemic in 
which the “in-group” harbors “prejudice towards members of other groups, either 
unconsciously or unwillingly” (Tankwanchi: 2014). He cites 80 percent of whites and 
Asians show anti-black bias and uses the example of the neglect of Ebola epicenters in 
Africa as an implicit bias towards Africans, which deemed them disposable (Tankwanchi: 
2014). In examining the data, we see an outpouring of negativity directed towards Africa, 
Thomas Duncan, and the CDC. Had the Ebola epidemic not occurred, perhaps these 
negative sentiments would not have been voiced, but the contagion combined with the 
moments of tension birthed from policy created an environment where bias and beliefs of 
disposability ran rampant.  
 The endless chants of “liar” directed at Duncan, the common belief Duncan was a 
bad person who deserved death, and the evisceration of the CDC because of its travel 
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policy show the status of power in the subtle. This subtle power coursed through the CDC 
policy and took hold of the media and public, and eventually manifested the moments of 
tension discussed above. Understanding the power in the subtle will not eliminate the 
moments of tension, but it can help to minimize the effects. The Ebola outbreak of 2014 
highlights the power in the subtle and is a learning opportunity to explore how to prevent 
racial instances and protect trust during a time of crisis. The critical gaze of the media 
and public will continue to exist, but understanding it and preparing for its inevitable 
display will help the credibility and trust with the CDC now and in cases of future 
contagions.  
Zika: Tensions & Tourism 
 The Zika virus is an interesting case as it is largely non-lethal and since it is an 
ongoing contagion event. Zika, like malaria, is often contracted via the bite of an infected 
mosquito (CDC: 2016). Once infected, the virus can be transmitted via sexual 
intercourse, blood transfusion, laboratory exposure, and from mother to fetus during 
pregnancy (CDC: 2016). Though the symptoms of fever, rash, and joint pain are less 
severe than those of the preview case studies; the virus’s effect on newborns is causing 
great concern among citizens globally. Newborns exposed to the Zika virus are at an 
increased risk of development abnormalities including hearing loss, impaired growth, 
ocular issues, and central nervous system defects (Frazer 2016: 10). Research also points 
to Zika as a cause of Microcephaly in infants, which is a condition where the head of the 
infant is significantly smaller than expected in relation to the size of the rest of the infant 
(Frazer 2016: 10). 
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 Additionally, there is no current vaccine or cure for the Zika virus aiding in the 
unease of the public. As in the Ebola and Anthrax contagions, the CDC is deeply 
involved in the fight against the spread of the Zika virus. Though the Zika virus is an 
ongoing issue both abroad and in the United States, we are beginning to see the early 
stages of moments of tension related to the virus and the CDC policies associated with it. 
From abortion rights to the tourism industry, the Zika virus and policies relating to it 
currently shape discourse and influence current affairs. Before we delve into the moments 
of tension, it is important to examine the history of the Zika virus and the areas at the 
epicenter of this contagion event.  
History of the Zika Virus & Current Epicenter 
 Again, like Anthrax and Ebola, Zika is not a new phenomenon. Zika was 
discovered in 1947 with the virus isolated among the Rhesus macaque population 
(Kindhauser 2016: 677). In 1952, the first human cases were discovered in Uganda and 
the United Republic of Tanzania (Kindhauser 2016: 677). During this time, the virus was 
detected in a few other nations including Egypt, Malaysia, and Vietnam (Kinderhauser 
2016: 677). In the following decades, the virus moved out of Uganda and across West 
Africa and eventually into Asia (Kinderhauser 2016: 677). Still, there were no outbreak 
situations in humans, and the virus was quite sporadic in its infection of hosts. In 2007, 
the Zika virus arrived on the island of Yap in the South Pacific and caused the first large 
outbreak of the virus (Kinderhauser 2016: 677). At least 185 cases of Zika were reported 
in Yap during the outbreak, though no deaths or hospitalizations were reported 
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(Kinderhauser 2016: 677). A few more outbreaks occurred in following years, but not to 
the magnitude of the current epidemic.  
 The current outbreak of Zika is a major concern for the Americas and the 
Caribbean. Since May of 2015, Zika infections in Northeastern Brazil rose to over 
1,500,000 cases (Wahid: 2016). Other epicenters of the ongoing outbreak include 
Venezuela, Paraguay, Guatemala, Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, and 
Panama (Wahid: 2016). While the United States is not dealing with the same severity as 
many other nations, Zika is a concern, especially in southeastern states. Zika infection via 
mosquito transmission was first reported in the Miami neighborhood of Wynwood in 
2016. The presence of Zika-bearing mosquitoes in this neighborhood is especially 
troubling given the frequent travel of its residents to places in the Caribbean and Latin 
America (Lockwood 2016: 4). Cases in Florida have continued to grow in recent weeks, 
and the virus has spread to other areas including Miami Beach and Tampa Bay 
(Lockwood 2016: 4). This disease has also become a major issue in Puerto Rico where it 
is estimated by the end of the year, 1 in 4 people will have been infected by the virus 
(Lockwood 2016: 4). With a rapidly growing outbreak and scores of infected, the early 
stages of moments of tension are formulating. 
Abortion Rights & Epidemic 
 One of the biggest concerns of the Zika virus is its effect on pregnancies.  It is 
estimated that .95 to 13.2 percent of Zika-affected pregnancies “may be at risk of severe 
congenital central nervous system pathology” (Lockwood 2016: 5). Given the risks and 
life-long effects of infants harmed by the Zika virus, discussions concerning abortion and 
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tensions between pro-life and pro-choice are beginning to emerge. One of the most 
fascinating moments of tension is the discourse on Zika and abortion in Brazil. The CDC 
does not have a policy concerning abortion, but the CDC’s coverage of the dangers of 
Zika to the fetus has been aggressive during the outbreak. Perhaps, the CDC’s strong 
education on the dangers of Zika birthed a new dialogue surrounding abortion rights. 
 In Brazil, a robust Catholic nation, abortion is a taboo. Abortion is illegal in 
Brazil except in cases of rape, anencephaly, or when the life of the mother is jeopardized 
by the pregnancy (PRI’s The World: 2016). Overall, policies on abortion in South and 
Central America are among the most restrictive in the world. The CDC is deeply 
involved in the fight against Zika in Brazil and has a number of recommendations 
specific to Brazilian women. These recommendations include advisory for pregnant 
women to discontinue travel to areas in Brazil below 6,500 feet (CDC: 2016). Other 
recommendations for women in Brazil include strict prevention methods to thwart 
mosquitoes and special guidelines for sexual intercourse with partners that have recently 
traveled to Zika zones in the country (CDC: 2016). Concerning Brazilian women, the 
CDC has an entire page dedicated to Zika awareness, preventions, and danger to the 
fetus.  
 As more and more women learn about the virus and its life-long effects on the 
child; an increase in the push for legal and safe abortion grows in Brazil. An increasing 
number of women’s groups in the country are pushing back against the strict abortion 
laws. In August, an organization dedicated to ending unsafe abortion presented a legal 
challenge to the Supreme Court with the argument that “Brazilian Government’s policies 
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on Zika and microcephaly had breached women’s human rights” (Boseley: 2016). Brazil 
pushed back with lawmakers developing stricter additions to existing abortion laws. 
Conservative lawmakers plan to create a legal framework where women would be 
sentenced to more than four years in prison for aborting a fetus with microcephaly (PRI’s 
The World: 2016). 
 Nikolas Rose would classify the government’s role concerning Zika and abortion 
as anti-risk biopolitics. In his text The Politics of Life Itself, Rose discusses a history of 
risk politics, which very much relates to the current abortion struggle in Brazil. Rose 
claims biopolitics, “tends to individualize human worth and discriminate against, 
constrains, or excludes those found biologically abnormal or defective” (Rose 2007: 2). 
He expands, “Some locate the wish to control the biological make-up of the population at 
the very heart of modernity, and elimination of foreign bodies and population purification 
is immanent within biopolitics” (Rose 2007: 2). We can relate Rose’s theory to the Nazi 
regime in Germany. During the Nazi rule, scores of “foreign bodies” were eliminated 
including the Jewish people and Gypsies to purify the German population. In essence, 
Rose illuminates the potential for state power in the arena of eugenics.  
 The role of the Brazilian government runs in opposition to Rose’s theory. Thus, I 
label their handling of the Zika-abortion debate as anti-risk biopolitics. The Brazilian 
government is not concerned with the potential risks and future complications of the 
many Zika pregnancies in the country. Because of a strong religious influence in 
Brazilian culture and governance, the risk of the Zika children does not outweigh their 
disdain for Rose’s location of power in risk biopolitics. Now, this is not an accolade to 
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the Brazilian government’s handling of the Zika-abortion debate; merely, it is an 
observation of their aversion to risk politics on the basis of religion. 
 However, the government’s stance on abortion and biopolitics runs counter to the 
beliefs of the countless pregnant women who are infected with the Zika virus. While the 
number of women seeking illegal abortions has always been high in Brazil, the figure 
dramatically increased in 2015. In 2015, the number of women who sought treatment for 
a botched abortion outpaced the number of women who receive legal abortions by 100 to 
one (McDonald: 2016). Wealthier women seeking to abort a Zika pregnancy usually can 
find an individual able to assist in a clandestine medical procedure, but for the countless 
women without financial means, the options are grim including black-market abortion 
pills, abortion teas, inserting sharp objects into the uterus, and other forms of self-harm 
(McDonald: 2016). 
 Again, the CDC is not directly responsible for the abortion tensions in Brazil. For 
decades prior to the outbreak abortion was illegal in the country and many women sought 
illegal abortions to end unintended pregnancies. But, the CDC’s education directed at 
Brazilian women and the significant risks of Zika to unborn children aids in the birth of 
this moment of tension. Once again, the power lies in the subtle. By educating Brazilian 
women on the dangers of Zika and the life-long effects children with microcephaly face, 
the CDC subtly influenced the abortion debate. Brazilian women, armed with knowledge 
given by the CDC coupled with other influencing factors, began to push back at the 
restrictive abortion laws. Again, the CDC and its policies are not directly responsible for 
this movement. Other influencing factors could include growing awareness of neighbors 
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or family members with health complications from botched abortions or first-hand 
experience with a child diagnosed with microcephaly.  
 As Foucault says, “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but 
because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault 1978: 93). Thus, in the case of Brazilian 
abortion concerning Zika, the CDC is an agency of knowledge that holds some of the 
power because it directed its knowledge at Brazilian women. It is the subtle power of the 
CDC compiled with the endless other Zika powers, both subtle and explicit, that shape 
the continuing discourse on Abortion in Brazil and globally. Though the debate is in its 
early stages in Brazil, perhaps we will see new Zika inspired abortion debates in other 
places including the United States.  
 While abortion is legal in the United States, there is a deep history of conservative 
lawmakers that try to hinder abortion access to women. The Zika virus and its effects on 
children have not hindered the conservative movement to thwart abortion access. Take 
for instance Florida Senator Marco Rubio who stated, “I believe all life is worthy of 
protection of our laws…and when you present it in the context of Zika or any other 
prenatal condition, it’s a difficult question and a hard one…but if I’m going to err , I’m 
going to err on the side of life (Caputo: 2016). With the Zika virus just beginning to 
encroach on Florida, it is unknown whether there is or will be a spike in abortions. But, 
the CDC will no doubt be an agent of power and knowledge for Miami locals concerning 
Zika and its risk.  
 Certainly, we can see the potential for a moment of tension in the United States 
between abortion activists and conservative lawmakers concerning Zika and 
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microcephaly. Whether its abortion discourse in Brazil or here in America, it is important 
to acknowledge that power is everywhere, especially in the subtle. The CDC may be a 
neutral entity concerning abortion rights, but its distribution of knowledge concerning 
Zika effects becomes a subtle power that is and likely will continue to influence to debate 
on abortion in many nations.   
Zika & Tourism Tension 
 Though the Zika-abortion debate is a more subtle moment of tension, the CDC’s 
policies regarding Zika has had a much more tangible impact on travel. The Zika virus’s 
timing and location are quite problematic for the tourism industry. Currently, the Zika 
virus is affecting many popular tourist destinations including Puerto Rico, Mexico, and 
Miami. Additionally, the 2016 Summer Olympics took place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
during a time of peak outbreak. Many of the most heavily affected areas depend on 
tourism revenue for their economies, but estimates for tourism in Zika regions are 
disappointing. The World Bank estimates the “disease will cost the world 3.5 billion 
dollars in 2016, mostly because of people avoiding travel to areas where the virus is 
being actively transmitted (Muchmore: 2016). 
 The CDC has many recommendations concerning travel to areas with an active 
Zika presence. For example, both in Brazil and Mexico, the CDC issued a level two alert 
for Zika and issued special guidelines for pregnant women including avoiding travel to 
areas under 6,500 feet (CDC: 2016). Additionally, the CDC issued special guidelines 
relating to the 2016 Rio Olympics. Pregnant women were advised by the CDC not to 
attend the Olympics (CDC: 2016). Furthermore, if the partner of the pregnant woman 
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must attend the Olympics, the women were advised to either use condoms or entirely 
avoid intercourse for the duration of the pregnancy (CDC: 2016). 
 The policy of the CDC coupled with a general fear of the virus appeared to 
influence many athletes to back out of the event entirely. Jason Day, Dustin Johnson, 
Jordan Spieth, Rory McIlroy, Vijay Singh, Milos Raonic, Simona Halep, Tomas 
Berdych, Karolina Pliscova, Tejay van Garderen, and Stephen Curry are just a sample of 
athletes that did not attend the Rio games because of Zika concerns (Palazzo: 2016). 
Many others athletes that attended the games took additional precautions because of Zika 
fears. For instance, Greg Rutherford, a British long-jumper, decided to freeze his sperm 
prior to traveling to Rio (Palazzo: 2016). Rutherford’s girlfriend discusses her Zika fears 
and cites the “100 plus medical experts who stressed the games should have been moved 
to prevent the spread of the disease” in her decision not to attend the games and the 
couple’s decision to freeze Rutherford’s sperm (Palazzo: 2016). 
 Zika fears coupled with medical professionals and CDC travel warnings for the 
region appeared to spook spectators as well. Though 88 percent of the 6 million tickets 
for the Rio Olympics were sold, only 25 percent of the tickets were sold to international 
tourists (Ansari: 2016). Previous Olympics such as the London Olympics of 2012 saw a 
higher yield in ticket sales and a strong performance concerning international tourism. 
During the games, London reaped an average of 1,290 pounds per Olympic visitor 
compared to the average 650 pounds spent by other visitors (The National Archives: 
2012). Most of the visitors to the London Games were residents of European nations, and 
an equal share came from the United States and other nations (The National Archives: 
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2012). The robust tourism figures for the London Games are likely in part to a lack of 
fear and policy surrounding the event. During the 2012 Olympics, there were no ongoing 
epidemics that posed a threat to the games, which cannot be said about the 2016 
Olympics. 
 Specific figures on tourism and revenue during the games are likely still in the 
process of being gathered. However, given the low percent of international travelers to 
the games, it is likely the results will be significantly lower than those of the London 
Olympics. Now, the CDC’s policies on travel cannot be solely blamed for the tension of 
lackluster international ticket sales and numerous athletes who backed out of the games. 
Another source of tension was certainly the media, which is highlighted by Daniel Baker 
in his text Zika Virus and the Media. Baker highlights the bombardment of fear-induced 
media coverage of the Zika virus and claims there is a “delicate balance between 
providing important heath information and scaring the public” (Baker 2016: 275). Baker 
cites a deluge of articles with titles such as “Fears Over Spread of Zika Virus Grow in the 
Caribbean” and “Public Health Agencies, Hospitals Prepare for Potential Zika Spread” 
(Baker 2016: 275). 
 As in any epidemic, fear is a factor in the creation of moments of tension. 
However, the CDC’s policies concerning travel to the Olympic games and other Zika 
regions do hold a subtle power. The subtle power can be explored in its Miami 
guidelines. The CDC recommends pregnant women refrain from travel to the Miami 
Beach area and dissuades travelers from unnecessarily visiting all parts of Miami-Dade 
County and Wynwood, Florida (CDC: 2016). It appears once the CDC locates the 
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presence of Zika-bearing mosquitoes and active cases in a given region; it recommends 
similar limitations for travel to that particular region. With ample CDC travel warnings in 
place coupled with strong media coverage, we are beginning to see an adverse effect on 
tourism in Zika hot zones. The chart below illustrated the current situation in the tourism 
industry in areas with Zika presence.    
Figure 7: Analysis of Zika & The Hotel Industry  
   In the above chart, we see the progression of discounted hotels offered on a 
luxury travel site for eight weeks in 2016. From August 19th till October 7th, the total 
offered sales on gilttravel.com were analyzed and investigated to determine the percent 
and average discount for hotels in areas with a Zika presence. While the total number of 
hotels in Zika regions and the number of United States hotels in Zika regions fluctuated 
from week to week, the average discount on Zika hotels mainly rose. The average 
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discount remained over 40 percent for six of the eight weeks and rose by over seven 
percent from the starting point of 39 percent to its ending point of 46.20 percent. Even the 
numbers that fluctuated showed a high presence of discounted hotels in Zika areas. Each 
week, the total percentage of hotels in regions with known Zika activity was hovered 
around or above 25 percent of the total sample for that particular week. The data 
illustrates a prominence of sales for hotels in Zika-affected areas and demonstrates a 
spike in the average discount as the weeks passed.   
 Now, in observing the percent of U.S. based hotels in Zika regions, we initially 
see a rise in the earlier weeks in the study followed by a steady drop off. However, the 
percentage of U.S. based hotels in Zika regions remained a consistently sizable portion of 
the sample for the duration of the analysis. Cumulatively, 28.6 percent of the hotels in the 
United States during the study were located in Zika regions with the vast majority in 
Miami Florida followed by a smaller percent in neighboring Floridian cities and Puerto 
Rico. The high percentage of discounts for hotels in Zika regions illustrates a lack of 
demand for hotels in certain areas such as Miami Beach and Mexico. The cumulative 
discount for hotels in the Zika-affected areas was over 42 percent, which could illustrate 
a lack of demand for the product. The lack of demand could be influenced by a number of 
different factors. But, given the Zika presence, the media attention, and the CDC policies 
on travel it is likely that Zika and its tension facilitators played a role in lowering the 
demand for hotels in these regions.  
 Again, the CDC’s travel policies concerning Zika are not solely responsible for 
the diminished demand for tourism in Miami, Mexico, Brazil, and other areas with a 
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known Zika presence. The heavy media coverage also bears responsibility for any 
adverse effects on tourism. But, the CDC’s policies are a piece to the puzzle and have 
unintended effects tourism, which are not yet fully known. It is known that many of the 
Zika-affected regions rely heavily on tourism for the wellbeing of their economies. For 
example, the hotel industry in Puerto Rico is 7 to 10 percent of the island’s GDP (Kim: 
2016). Florida is also a major tourist destination with Miami-Dade country attracting 
millions of visitors each year. In 2014, 14.6 million visitors visited Miami and added 
nearly 24 billion dollars into the Floridian economy (Muzenrieder: 2016). As already 
mentioned, The World Bank estimates the Zika virus will lead to billions of dollars in 
losses for global economies. Though specific figures of lost tourism revenue for Zika-
affected areas will likely remain unknown for the foreseeable future, the impact of 
security risk via disease will be a factor in the 2016 global tourism statistics. 
 Bruce Prideaux studies the concept of security risk and its impact on tourism in 
his research paper Factors Affecting Bilateral Tourism Flows. Prideaux explores the 
relationship between risk and tourism in four categories including political tensions, 
concerns for personal safety, fear of crime, and heath epidemics (Prideaux: 2005). He 
cites the negative impact of the September 11th attacks on American and global tourism, 
and the harm political instability inflicted on the growth potential of the Mexican tourism 
industry (Prideaux: 2005). Prideaux also examines the role of disease in tourism by 
unpacking the 2003 SARS epidemic. Prideaux explains the role of security and risk in 
relation to the Chinese tourism industry during the outbreak. He explains the uncertainty 
generated by the SARS epidemic fueled a decline in Chinese tourism in which “Hong 
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Kong hotels experienced a vacancy rate of 80 percent” during the peak of the outbreak 
(Prideaux: 2005). 
 Using Prideaux’s theory of security risk on tourism, we can theorize Zika will 
have a tangible impact on global tourism. Like SARS in 2003, Zika is a security risk, 
which many people will try to protect themselves from its infection potential. Already, 
we can see the early effects of the Zika security risk, which has manifested in steep hotel 
discounts in Zika-affected regions. The security risk of Zika is influenced and further 
aggravated by constant media prodding and the policies of the CDC that warn against 
travel to Zika regions. These dynamics that interact with the CDC policies on Zika 
highlight the power in the subtle. 
 There is no single factor that can be attributed to any negative tourism impacts 
associated with the Zika virus. However, the CDC’s policy on travel coupled with other 
aggravating agents such as the media birthed a moment of tension, which is interacting 
with international tourism. We are seeing this moment of tension play out domestically 
and flowing over U.S. borders and into foreign nations. In the case of tourism, power is 
subtle because power is everywhere. The power lies in many areas including Zika fear, 
media coverage, and the knowledge produced by the CDC. There is no doubt that the 
CDC isn’t intentionally trying to harm tourism in places such as Miami and Rio de 
Janeiro. However, the knowledge they produce in their policies and recommendations 
play a subtle role in influencing the decisions of tourists, especially when the power in 
the policies interact with the media’s power and the power of fear.  
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 Since Foucault believes power exists in all facets of life, it is paramount to 
understand how the subtle and seemingly small decisions can have massive impacts on 
other areas of life. The CDC is a well-respected agency and what they recommend 
matters. But what the CDC conveys in its policies has the power to influence areas most 
wouldn’t immediately think. Understanding the power of the policies is the key to 
preparing for the unintended moments of tension including the debate on abortion and 
tourism impacts. It may not be possible to completely alleviate these moments of tension, 
but we do have the power to prepare for them. In understanding the power in the subtle 
including CDC policies, perhaps, we can better predict future moments of tension for 
both the current Zika outbreaks and epidemics yet to manifest.  
Conclusion  
 In this study, we traveled fifteen years and explored three very different contagion 
events. Each event led to different moments of tension, but the power in the subtle 
remained constant. We can cite the power of the subtle in the language used by the CDC 
in its briefings during the Anthrax attacks of 2001. We can also cite the power of the 
subtle in the CDC’s Zika travel ban and its policy for open travel during the Ebola 
epidemic. Though unexpected and likely unintended, these policies had tangible effects 
on people and places in many regions. The creation of a Muslim risk group in 2001 and 
diminished tourism in Zika-affected areas are just a few of the effects of the subtle power 
encompassing CDC policies.  
 The purpose of this paper is not to condemn the CDC or its handling of contagion 
events. On the contrary, I believe the CDC does an excellent job in managing 
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unbelievably difficult situations. However, it is important to recognize areas that could 
use improvement. Though the CDC does not aim to assist in the creation of moments of 
tension, it is a part of the creation of these moments because of the subtleties. Foucault 
believes power is everywhere, which means it must also lie within the subtle and 
unintended. The CDC and its policies are not directly responsible for the creation of risk 
groups and fear-factors, but seemingly insignificant details like language and travel 
recommendations do hold power, which can effect citizens of the United States and those 
beyond U.S. borders. It is this power that must be understood to prepare better and 
prevent future moments of tension during contagion events.  
 While I am satisfied with the research of this thesis, there were a few limitations 
encountered during the study. Firstly, due to time constraints, I was unable to conduct 
interviews, which would be helpful in showing the full extent of the moments of tension. 
Additionally, the Zika case study, though fascinating, is still an active event. Its status as 
an active event prevents us from knowing both the extent of the effects of the CDC 
policies and whether more moments of tension will erupt based on CDC policies. With 
that said, this research is a relatively new branch in the discourse on global health and 
contagion events, which will hopefully be built upon further by other scholars.  
 The research in this study raises a number of questions that deserve exploration. 
Scholars could examine the Zika crisis at its conclusion to explore the policies and 
complete moments of tension. Because power is everywhere, scholars could build upon 
this research and explore the endless other features that assisted in the creation of the 
moments of tension explored in this study. Perhaps, one of the most fascinating 
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facilitators of the moments of tension was the media and its coverage of Ebola and Zika. 
It is likely future scholars could write an entire dissertation on the media and the power it 
has in influencing moments of tension during health crises.  
 While my research focused specifically on the CDC policies and a subtle power, it 
also highlighted the importance to critically look at events. Shades of gray are important 
in analyzing health events and all aspects of life because the each event is not black and 
white. I hope my research shows the importance of agencies like the CDC because 
contagion events do have the power to harm countless individuals and hinder the security 
of the nation-state. But, there is a need to create health security without harming groups 
of individuals or regions in the process. From Muslims and Africans to tourism in Miami 
Beach and San Juan, there are many examples of people and places caught in the space 
where security and contagion policies intersect. It is paramount that organizations such as 
the CDC work to protect all groups and regions during contagion events. It is equally 
important to recognize that the policies and recommendations of the CDC hold the power 
to alter the lives of countless civilians, both local and global. Only by understanding the 
subtle power that resides in CDC policies can we go forth and achieve health security for 
the entire global population.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Young 79 
 
Work Cited 
 
Adeyanju, Charles T., and Temitope Oriola. "'Not In Canada': The Non-Ebola Panic And 
Media Misrepresentation Of The Black Community." African Journal Of Criminology & 
Justice Studies 4.1 (2010): 32-54. SocINDEX with Full Text. Web. 23 June 2016. 
 
"Advice for People Living in or Traveling to South Florida." Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 19 Sept. 2016. Web. 28 
Sept. 2016. 
 
Ansari, Azedah. "Rio Olympics 2016: Why All the Empty Seats?" CNN. Cable News 
Network, 18 Aug. 2016. Web. 28 Sept. 2016. 
 
Anthrax In America. [Electronic Resource] : A Chronology And Analysis Of The Fall 
2001 Attacks. n.p.: Washington, DC : Center for Counterproliferation Research, National 
Defense University, [2002], 2002. Ignacio: USF Libraries Catalog. Web. 29 Aug. 2016. 
 
"Antibiotic-resistant Superbug Has Spread to Majority of US States – CDC." RT 
International. N.p., 03 Apr. 2015. Web. 29 Sept. 2016. 
 
Baker, Danial E. "Zika Virus And The Media." Hospital Pharmacy 51.4 (2016): 275-276. 
CINAHL Complete. Web. 28 Sept. 2016. 
 
"Basic Information." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 01 Sept. 2015. Web. 27 Aug. 2016. 
 
Boseley, Sarah. "Zika Emergency Pushes Women to Challenge Brazil's Abortion Law." 
The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 19 July 2016. Web. 27 Sept. 2016. 
 
Caputo, Marc. "Rubio: No Abortions for Zika-infected Women." Politico. Politico, 06 
Aug. 2016. Web. 28 Sept. 2016. 
 
Cohen, Emma. "The 2014 Ebola Epidemic and Racial "Othering"" Georgetown 
University Journal of Health Sciences. Georgetown University, 2015. Web. 26 Sept. 
2016. 
 
Cohn, Samuel. "Plague And Prejudice." History Today 66.3 (2016): 31. MAS Ultra - 
School Edition. Web. 27 June 2016. 
 
"Could Ebola Become Airborne? | Fox News." Fox News. FOX News Network, 16 Oct. 
2014. Web. 10 Sept. 2016. 
 
Young 80 
 
Davidson, Amy. "Amber Vinson’s Flight: An Ebola Nurse and the C.D.C." The New 
Yorker. N.p., 16 Oct. 2014. Web. 15 Sept. 2016. 
 
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. London: Pluto, 1986. Print. 
Foucault, Michael. “The History of Sexuality,” New York, Pantheon, 1978. Print. 
 
Frazer, Christine, and Leslie C. Hussey. "In The Midst Of Zika: The Role Of Childbirth 
Professionals." International Journal Of Childbirth Education 31.3 (2016): 7-12. 
CINAHL Complete. Web. 22 Sept. 2016. 
 
Frieden, M.D. Thomas. "CDC Chief: Why I Don't Support a Travel Ban to Combat Ebola 
Outbreak | Fox News." Fox News. FOX News Network, 09 Oct. 2014. Web. 07 Sept. 
2016. 
 
Freidlin, Daniel L. "Just Say No: The Cipro Craze And Managed Care - Applying The 
Hand Formula To Managed Care Decisions." Hofstra Law Review 30.(2002): 1329. 
LexisNexis Academic: Law Reviews. Web. 29 Sept. 2016. 
 
Goodwin, Robin. "BMC Infectious Diseases." Initial Psychological Responses to 
Influenza A, H1N1 ("Swine Flu"). N.p., 27 May 2009. Web. 23 June 2016. 
 
Gostin, Lawrence O., James G. Hodge Jr., and Scott Burris. "Is The United States 
Prepared For Ebola?." JAMA: Journal Of The American Medical Association 312.23 
(2014): 2497. Publisher Provided Full Text Searching File. Web. 12 Sept. 2016. 
 
Harrod, Kevin S. "Ebola: History, Treatment, And Lessons From A New Emerging 
Pathogen." American Journal Of Physiology. Lung Cellular And Molecular Physiology 
308.4 (2015): L307-L313. MEDLINE. Web. 7 Sept. 2016. 
 
HODGE JR., JAMES G.1,2,3. "Legal Myths Of Ebola Preparedness And Response." 
Notre Dame Journal Of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 29.2 (2015): 355-373. Index to 
Legal Periodicals & Books Full Text (H.W. Wilson). Web. 28 June 2016. 
 
Horgan, John. "Ebola “Fear Mongering” Critiqued by Medical Anthropologist." 
Scientific American. Scientific American, 03 Sept. 2014. Web. 24 Sept. 2016. 
 
"Information about Ebola for Travelers." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Aug. 2014. Web. 07 Sept. 2016. 
 
Johnstone, Megan-Jane. "Editorial: The Moral Significance Of Antimicrobial Resistance 
And The Rise Of 'Apocalyptic Superbugs'." Journal Of Clinical Nursing 25.15/16 (2016): 
2079-2082. CINAHL Complete. Web. 29 Sept. 2016. 
 
Young 81 
 
Kim, Susanna. "Tourism Industry in Cash-Stapped Puerto Rico Attempts to Calm Zika 
Fears." ABC News. ABC News Network, 14 May 2016. Web. 09 Oct. 2016. 
 
Kindhauser, Mary Kay, et al. "Zika: The Origin And Spread Of A Mosquito-Borne 
Virus." Bulletin Of The World Health Organization 94.9 (2016): 675-686C. CINAHL 
Complete. Web. 22 Sept. 2016. 
 
Krucoff, Carol. "Downside of Widespread Cipro Use as Anthrax Treatment." Downside 
of Widespread Cipro Use as Anthrax Treatment. UCLA, 29 Oct. 2001. Web. 30 Aug. 
2016. 
 
LOCKWOOD, CHARLES J. "Zika: A Report From The Front Lines." Contemporary 
OB/GYN 61.9 (2016): 4-9. CINAHL Complete. Web. 27 Sept. 2016. 
 
Logan, Carolyn. Counterbalance: Gendered Perspectives for Writing and Language. 
Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview, 1997. Print. 
 
"London 2012 Games Attract over Half a Million Overseas Visitors in July and August." 
Office For National Statistics. The National Archives, 11 Oct. 2012. Web. 28 Sept. 2016. 
 
Mayo Clinic Staff. "Anthrax." Symptoms. Mayo Clinic, 06 July 2015. Web. 01 Sept. 
2016. 
 
Mayo Clinic Staff. “Lung Cancer.” Risk Factors. Mayo Clinic, Sept. 2015. Web. 21 June 
2016. 
 
Mayo Clinic Staff. “Skin Cancer.” Risk Factors. Mayo Clinic, 10 June 2015. Web. 21 
June 2016. 
 
McDonald, Brent. "Brazil’s Abortion Restrictions Compound Challenge of Zika Virus." 
The Americas. New York Times, 18 May 2016. Web. 28 Sept. 2016 
 
McGovern, Mike. "Bushmeat and the Politics of Disgust — Cultural Anthropology." 
Bushmeat and the Politics of Disgust — Cultural Anthropology. Cultural Anthropology, 
07 Oct. 2014. Web. 24 Sept. 2016. 
 
McNeill, John Robert., and Corinna R. Unger. Environmental Histories of the Cold War. 
Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2010. Print. 
 
“Mission, Role, and Pledge.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 14 Apr. 2014. Web 13 Oct. 2016. 
 
Mongoven, Ann, PhD. "Ebola: A Tough Teacher." MSU Bioethics. N.p., 29 Aug. 2014. 
Web. 26 Sept. 2016. 
Young 82 
 
 
Muchmore, Shannon. "Costs of Zika among the Many Unknowns of the Virus." Modern 
Healthcare. Modern Healthcare, 20 July 2016. Web. 28 Sept. 2016. 
 
Munzenrieder, Kyle. "Miami Tourism Breaks Records Again: 14.6 Million People 
Visited in 2014." Miami New Times. N.p., 02 Apr. 2016. Web. 09 Oct. 2016. 
 
Palazzo, Chiara. "Rio Olympics: Which Athletes Have Withdrawn over Zika Fears?" The 
Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 04 Aug. 2016. Web. 28 Sept. 2016. 
 
Pernick, Martin S. "Contagion and Culture." American Literary History 2002: 858. 
JSTOR Journals. Web. 25 June 2016. 
 
Petersen, Lody, and Robert Pear. "Anthrax Fears Send Demand for a Drug Far Beyond 
Output." The New York Times. The New York Times, 15 Oct. 2001. Web. 30 Aug. 2016. 
 
"Press Briefing Transcript." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 14 Nov. 2001. Web. 30 Aug. 2016. 
 
"Press Briefing Transcript." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 15 Nov. 2001. Web. 01 Sept. 2016. 
 
Price-Smith, Andrew T., and Andrew T. Price-Smith. Contagion And Chaos. [Electronic 
Resource] : Disease, Ecology, And National Security In The Era Of Globalization. n.p.: 
Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, c2009., 2009. Ignacio: USF Libraries Catalog. Web. 25 
June 2016. 
 
Price, Polly J. "Infecting The Body Politic: Observations On Health Security And The 
'Undesirable' Immigrant." The University Of Kansas Law Review 63.(2015): 917. 
LexisNexis Academic: Law Reviews. Web. 21 June 2016. 
 
Prideaux, Bruce. "Factors Affecting Bilateral Tourism Flows." Annals Of Tourism 
Research 32.(2005): 780-801. ScienceDirect. Web. 9 Oct. 2016. 
 
Rose, Nikolas S. Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the 
Twenty-first Century. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007. Print 
 
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979. Print. 
 
Sargent, Carolyn, and Stéphanie Larchanché. "Disease, Risk, And Contagion: French 
Colonial And Postcolonial Constructions Of 'African' Bodies." Journal Of Bioethical 
Inquiry 11.4 (2014): 455-466 12p. CINAHL Complete. Web. 21 June 2016. 
 
Young 83 
 
Shane, Scott. "F.B.I., Laying Out Evidence, Closes Anthrax Case." The New York 
Times. The New York Times, 19 Feb. 2010. Web. 01 Sept. 2016. 
 
"Signs and Symptoms." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 02 Nov. 2014. Web. 07 Sept. 2016. 
 
@splcenter. "Anti-Muslim Incidents Since Sept. 11, 2001." Southern Poverty Law 
Center. N.p., 29 Mar. 2011. Web. 01 Sept. 2016. 
 
Sternbach, George. "Medical Classics: The History Of Anthrax." Journal Of Emergency 
Medicine 24.(2003): 463-467. ScienceDirect. Web. 27 Aug. 2016. 
 
Tankwanchi, Akhenaten. "Ebola, Thomas Duncan's Death, and the Biopolitics of 
Disposability." Psychology Benfits Society (2014): n. pag. Print. 
 
"Thanks To Zika, Now We Know Latin America Has The Toughest Abortion Policies In 
The World." PRI's The World (2016): Literature Resource Center. Web. 27 Sept. 2016. 
 
Totten, Robbie J. "Epidemics, National Security, And US Immigration Policy." Defense 
& Security Analysis 31.3 (2015): 199-212. Political Science Complete. Web. 27 June 
2016. 
 
Towers, Sherry, et al. "Mass Media And The Contagion Of Fear: The Case Of Ebola In 
America." Plos ONE 10.6 (2015): 1. Publisher Provided Full Text Searching File. Web. 
25 June 2016. 
 
"Transmission & Risks." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 27 Aug. 2016. Web. 22 Sept. 2016. 
 
"Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax and Interim Guidelines for 
Exposure Management and Antimicrobial Therapy, October 2001." Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 26 Oct. 2001. Web. 
30 Aug. 2016. 
 
"U.S. Food and Drug Administration." Information on Cipro (Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride) for Inhalation Anthrax for Consumers: Questions and Answers 
(11/14/2001). FDA, 09 Jan. 2015. Web. 30 Aug. 2016. 
 
Vlahos, Kelley Beaucar. "Could Ebola Virus Become 'bioterrorist Threat'? | Fox News." 
Fox News. FOX News Network, 17 Oct. 2014. Web. 10 Sept. 2016. 
 
Wahid, Braira, et al. "Review: Zika: As An Emergent Epidemic." Asian Pacific Journal 
Of Tropical Medicine 9.(2016): 723-729. ScienceDirect. Web. 27 Sept. 2016. 
 
Young 84 
 
“WHO | Ground Zero in Guinea: The Ebola Outbreak Smoulders – Undetected – for 
More than 3 Months." WHO | Ground Zero in Guinea: The Ebola Outbreak Smoulders – 
Undetected – for More than 3 Months. World Health Organization, 2014. Web. 06 Sept. 
2016. 
 
"WHO | Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 
Ebola Outbreak in West Africa." WHO | Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR 
Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. World Health 
Organization, Aug. 2014. Web. 07 Sept. 2016. 
 
Wong, L, and I Sam. "Behavioral Responses To The Influenza A(H1N1) Outbreak In 
Malaysia." Journal Of Behavioral Medicine 34.1 (2011): 23-31 9p. CINAHL Complete. 
Web. 25 June 2016. 
 
 Young, Joseph “Research Proposal: The Politics of Contagion.” Research Methods. 9 
Apr. 2016. Print. 13 Oct. 20 
 
Zalloua, Zahi Anbra, and Bruce A. Magnusson. Contagion : Health, Fear, Sovereignty. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost). Web. 25 
June 2016. 
 
"Zika Virus in Brazil." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 05 Aug. 2016. Web. 27 Sept. 2016. 
 
"2016 Summer Olympics." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 11 Aug. 2016. Web. 28 Sept. 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Young 85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
